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Relying on an conceptual approach that mixes economics and law, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2008) document that legal rules and regulations protecting investors vary 
systematically among legal origins and related institutions. They further argue and show 
that such differences do affect various economic outcomes. Relying of the ground-
breaking work of LLSV, many studies find extensive evidence on how a country`s legal 
system affects, among other things, its capital market development, the governance of 
firms and the properties of accounting information. In that context, the quality of external 
auditing, which does encompass the pricing of such services, are widely perceived to 
underlie capital market development, corporate governance and accounting information. 
However, prior empirical research pays scant attention to the interface between country-
level legal systems or macro-economic factors and audit pricing. Thus, whether and how 
audit pricing is influenced by a country’s legal system remain open questions.  
Hence, this dissertation purports to shed further light on the pricing of audit 
services and on the effect of such pricing on the quality of financial reporting, as proxied 
by accounting accruals, across different legal regimes. I measure accruals as either total 
accruals or discretionary accruals. In addition, I adopt multiple measures to proxy for a 
iv 
 
country’s legal institutions, such as rules of law, strength of legal enforcement and 
investor protection. Using a sample of 23,398 observations on audit fees from 13 
countries for the period 1996-2006, I find the following results. Firstly, I find that audit 
fees are associated with higher accruals across countries. Additional analysis reveals that 
the fees-accruals association is more likely to be driven by the “Risk pricing” argument, 
which argues that auditors charge higher fees to compensate for additional engagement 
risks that are reflected in higher accruals. Secondly, I find that a country’s legal regime 
plays a significant role in audit pricing. Specifically, the positive fees-accruals 
association is more pronounced for firms from weak legal environments.  
In the next stage of analysis, I proceed to investigate the impact of large audit fees 
on investors’ perceived audit independence. I find a significant positive association 
between audit fees and a firm`s Tobin’s Q, and this association is more pronounced under 
weak legal environment than under strong legal environment. I further test whether 
excessive audit fees help to predict future profitability or not. My analyses show that 
audit fees are significantly and positively associated with CFO of next year. These results 
suggest that abnormally large audit fees are priced by the stock market because they help 
predict a firm’s future profitability, thus providing valuable information to investors. 
Overall, my findings lead to the conclusion that auditors charge higher fees to 
clients with larger accruals for risk-pricing purposes. My analyses do not suggest that 
such large fees compromise auditor independence. Moreover, the evidence suggests that 
legal institutions play critical roles in terms of accrual choices and of audit pricing. 
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Why do accounting and auditing practices vary across countries? The origins of a 
country’s legal system, its institutions, cultural environment, politics, along with 
historical factors are frequently noted as the primary factors that have led to the wide 
range of accounting and auditing practices among nations. The law and finance literatures 
have documented the important role of legal institutions in determining a country’s 
market corporate and governance practices. Recently, accounting research has begun to 
rigorously test the impact of legal origins on properties of accounting numbers, auditing 
practices, governance mechanisms, and other issues. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) and La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) document that legal rules and regulations 
protecting investors vary systematically among legal origins and related institutions, and 
these differences affect economic outcomes as indicated below: 
 “Compared to French civil law, common law is associated with (a) better 
investor protection, which in turn is associated with improved financial development, 
better access to finance, and higher ownership dispersion, (b) lighter government 
ownership and regulation, which are in turn associated with less corruption, better 
functioning labor markets, and smaller unofficial economies, and (c) less formalized and 
more independent judicial systems, which are in turn associated with more secure 
property rights and better contract enforcement” (La Porta et al. 2008). 
Relying of the ground-breaking work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, many studies show that properties of accounting information are a product of the 
different legal systems prevalent around the world. In addition, other research shows that 
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legal origins are important in explaining the variations in specific auditing and 
governance practices across countries. In the context of audit pricing, the importance of 
macroeconomic and institutional factors for assessing audit risks and audit pricing has 
been widely emphasized by classic auditing textbooks and practice guidelines. However, 
empirical research has paid little attention to examining the role of country-level legal 
systems or macro-economic factors in audit pricing.  
Beginning with Simunic (1980), an extant body of literature has tested cross-
sectional audit fee determinants using single-country samples from different countries. 
Choi, Kim, Liu and Simunic (2008) firstly extended this stream of research by using 
international data from 15 countries around the world. Choi et al. (2008) point out that 
“[n]ational-level legal environment are likely to influence clients’ reporting incentives 
and auditors’ assessments of audit risks, which in turn affect the auditors’ effort choices 
and audit fees.” They find that the significant variances in legal regimes between nations 
drive the cross-country differences in audit fees, suggesting a country’s legal regime is a 
critical determinant of audit fees. In their study, Choi et al. (2008) use a single measure, 
the litigation risk, to proxy for legal environment of a country.  
Although Choi et al. (2008) has moved the audit fees study one step forward, the 
role of legal environment in audit pricing still largely remains unknown: does a country’s 
other legal institutions (e.g., rule of law, strength of legal enforcement, investor rights 
protection) influence audit pricing? And how do legal institutions influence audit pricing? 
This dissertation aims to shed light on these questions. 
To examine the role of legal institutions in the process of audit pricing, I 
specifically developed three following research questions: (1) Do auditors take into 
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account clients’ accruals when pricing their services? (2) Does a country’s legal 
institution influence the association between audit fees and accruals? (3) Do investors 
view large audit fees as implying impaired audit independence and lower audit quality? 
The first research question examines the link between an auditor’s assessments of risk 
and client’s accrual level.  The second research question explores the role of legal 
institutions in the process of audit pricing. This is because a nation’s legal environment 
provides different reporting incentives to managers, which transpose into a firm’s 
accruals.1 Auditors thus assign different audit risk multiples to accruals reported by firms 
from different legal environments, which in turn affect audit pricing. Finally, the third 
question investigates the economic outcomes of audit pricing.  
Stated another way, this study explores an auditor’s pricing behavior with cross-
country data, and tests whether and how strength of legal institutions appears to be an 
important determinant of audit fees. Therefore, Legal Origins Theory is an appropriate 
and fundamental theoretical basis for the study. I propose a theoretical framework of the 
study as following, illustrated in FIGURE 1 below. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
I briefly introduce motivations, hypothesis development, research design, main 
findings and contributions of the dissertation below. 
 
Motivations and research questions 
As discussed above, prior research finds extensive evidence on how legal systems 
impact capital market development, corporate governance, accounting information 
                                                          
1
 For example, Huang (2001) and Leuz (2003) both find that managers are more likely to use accounting 
discretion opportunistically in weak legal regimes. Then auditors may assess accruals with higher 
possibilities of earnings manipulation as greater audit risk. 
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properties etc., and little empirical evidence is found on the role of legal institutions on 
auditing practices. Thus, whether and how audit pricing is influenced by a country’s legal 
system remain to be open empirical questions. One purpose of this dissertation is to fill 
this gap by exploring the fees-accruals association across different legal regimes. 
Another motivation of this dissertation is to enhance understanding of audit 
services by reexamining the association between audit fees and accruals. As early as the 
1980s, both Simunic and DeAngelo pointed out that one impediment to understanding 
audit service is the ambiguity of the relationship between auditors, audited firms and 
external financial statement users. On the one hand, to comply with codes of ethics, 
auditors must uphold their independence and objectivity. On the other hand, auditors are 
hired and compensated by their clients. Such a relationship between auditor and client 
creates an inborn problem of independence to auditors. In response, many users appear to 
misunderstand the role of auditor and the nature of audit service.  
In practice, audit independence has been perceived as threatened by economic 
dependence of auditors on clients. After a series of high-profile financial scandals around 
the year 2000, audit independence and audit quality have been widely doubted by the 
market. The Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) stated its concern that additional 
fees obtained by auditors through excessive high audit fees and provision of non-audit 
service may further increase the auditor-client economic bond and erode audit 
independence (both in-fact and in-appearance).2 In order to rebuild investors’ confidence 
on audit quality and capital market, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
                                                          
2 The SEC issued Final Rule S7-13-00, Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements 
in November 2000 (“SEC 2000”), which requires firms to disclose amount and types of audit fees paid to 
auditors.   
 - 5 - 
 
(“SOX 2002”) to impose mandatory restrictions on auditors providing non-audit services 
to clients.  
Along with this concern, a long line of accounting research looks into the 
relationship between audit fees and financial reporting quality by examining whether the 
potential fee-induced economic bond erode audit independence. Theoretically, audit fees 
are linked to earnings quality through their association with audit independence. Auditing 
services are believed to provide assurance to reliability and faithfulness of financial 
statements, which lend additional credibility to a firm’s financial reporting. Thus, the 
higher level of audit independence, the higher level of audit quality, and the higher level 
is the earnings quality (Becker et al. 1998). Prior studies testing fees-quality association 
use audit fees to proxy for audit independence. Most of these studies adopt the long-
standing “economic bonding” theory, which argues that audit independence is threatened 
by economic dependence of an auditor on client fees. Auditors with excessive audit fees 
have great economic dependence on clients and may have greater propensity to 
compromise audit independence, which consequently leading to lower earnings quality. 
Therefore, in prior studies, high level of audit fees was used to proxy for great economic 
bond and low audit independence. 
Nevertheless, empirical studies over the past several decades fail to provide 
consistent results on the perspective that audit fees are related to impaired audit 
independence. On the one hand, a number of studies document a significant negative 
association between audit fees and different measures of earnings quality, supporting the 
perspective that audit independence is impaired through fee dependence (e.g., Frankel et 
al. (2002), Sengupta and Shen (2007), Choi et al. (2010), etc.). On the other hand, another 
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stream of studies documents opposing results and finds a significant positive association 
between audit pricing and earnings quality. For example, Srinidhi and Gul (2007) argue 
that higher audit fees should represent more audit effort and show a significant positive 
association between audit fees and accruals quality. In addition, there still exists a few 
studies which fail to find any significant relationship between the two, such as DeFond et 
al. (2002), Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Larker and Richardson (2004). 
With regard to the mixed findings on the association between audit fees and 
earnings quality, this study is to revisit the relationship between audit fees and accruals 
and contribute to the literature in this arena. To enhance understanding of auditor pricing 
behavior, this study further explores two subsidiary questions: what is the association 
between audit fees and accruals? If there exists a significant relationship, why are audit 
fees associated with accruals? 
To sum up, this dissertation is motivated by two goals. One goal is to meet 
research gap in which there is a lacking of research concerning the role of legal 
institutions on audit pricing. The other goal is to enhance our understanding on audit 
service by re-investigating the association between audit fees and accruals, and to add 
new evidence to mixed results in most previous research. Specifically, I investigate the 
following research questions: 
(1) Do auditors take into account clients’ accruals when pricing their services? 
      ---- What is the association between audit fees and accruals? 
      ---- Why are audit fees related with accruals? 
(2) Do a country’s legal institutions influence the fees-accruals association? 
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(3) Is audit independence in-appearance, as assessed by investors, impaired by 
large audit fees?  
 
Hypotheses development 
The link between audit fees and accruals can be explained by two alternative 
ways: the “economic bonding” theory and “risk pricing” reasoning. Economic bonding 
theory argues that audit independence is threatened by economic dependence of an 
auditor on client fees. Excessive audit fees provide auditors incentives to acquiesce to 
client’s pressure and compromise audit independence, which in turn lower earnings 
quality. The economic bonding theory suggests that the positive fees-accruals association 
is due to impaired audit independence. 
In this study, I adopt the “risk pricing” reasoning, which argues that auditors 
assign higher audit risk to firms with higher accruals and thus charge a higher fees. Along 
with “risk pricing” reasoning, there are at least four reasons that explain why audit fees 
are expected to positively related with accruals. First, different from other accounting 
items, accruals are hard to detect and audit (Gul et al. 2003, Francis and Krishnan 1999) 
and may need more hours and effort. Second, increased levels of accruals represent 
increased engagement uncertainty and risk (Simunic and Stein 1996). For example, 
auditors may plan increased effort and billing rates (audit specialization) for clients with 
earnings manipulation risk (Bedard and Johnstone 2004). As a result, auditors charge 
larger fees to conduct more hours of audit to decrease detection risk to an acceptable 
level and /or simply charge a higher fee premium to compensate for potential future 
litigation. Third, abnormal accruals increase the likelihood of firm-level litigation risk 
 - 8 - 
 
(Boone et al. 2011). Auditors may therefore pass the cost of higher risk to their clients by 
charging higher fees. Fourth, some companies use accounting discretion for legitimate 
reasons while other companies may misuse their discretion to manipulate earnings, and 
it’s up to auditors to distinguish accounting discretion from management opportunism. 
This decision requires additional work and thus greater fees (Schelleman et al. 2010). 
Based on these arguments, I make my first prediction, which is audit fees are positively 
associated with accruals. 
The role of legal institutions on the fees-accruals association could be understood 
by looking at the impacts of a nation’s legal system on a manager’s reporting incentives 
and an auditor’s assessment of risks. The same magnitude of accruals could be reflective 
of two different types of reporting incentives. Managers have certain degree of discretion 
and flexibility in reporting their financial performance, which is allowed and encouraged 
by accrual-basis accounting.3 Managers may opportunistically use these flexibilities to 
manipulate earnings, or they may choose to communicate private value-relevant 
information to stakeholders. As a result, accruals may be reflective of earnings 
manipulation or accounting discretion with legitimate reasons. Accruals used for 
opportunistic reasons are more likely to be assessed with higher inherent risk by auditors 
and thus higher audit fees than accruals used with legitimate reasons. This is because 
opportunistic accruals are less likely than informational accruals to be subsequently 
realized into cash flows. One way of capturing these two different types of accruals is to 
investigate a manager’s reporting incentives which influence the likelihood that accruals 
will be subsequently realized (Gul et al. 2003). 
                                                          
3
 Accrual basis accounting increases the relevance and timeliness of accounting to better capture business 
essence than cash basis accounting. 
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In this dissertation, I use country-level legal institutions to capture a manager’s 
different incentives on earnings management across countries. In their international 
studies, Huang (2001) and Leuz (2003) both find that managers are more likely to behave 
opportunistically in an environment with weak investor protection rights. This is because 
under such an environment, managers have more incentives to expropriate interests from 
outsiders and to mask firm performance.  
As such, in countries with weak legal regimes, managers have more incentives 
and possibilities to opportunistically manipulate earnings. This type of earnings is less 
likely to be consequently realized, which is assessed by auditors with higher inherent risk 
and thus result in larger audit fees. Thus, my second prediction is that country-level legal 
institutions have impacts on the association between audit fees and accruals. Specifically, 




Given the above background, this study aims to test the association between audit 
fees and accruals, and how the fees-accruals association varies when legal regime shifts 
across countries. Following prior studies examining the linkage between audit fees and 
earnings quality, I use two alternative ways to measure accruals, the total accruals and 
discretionary accruals. In addition, I use multiple measures to proxy for a country’s legal 
institutions, such as rules of law, strength of legal enforcement and investor protection. 
Using a sample of 23,398 observations on audit fees from 13 countries for the period 
1996-2006, I find the following results: 
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First, I find that audit fees are significantly and positively associated with 
measures of accruals for the full sample across countries. This result strongly supports 
my first hypothesis, suggesting that the magnitude of accruals is positively associated 
with audit fees. In addition, this finding adds additional evidence to the mixed results of 
previous research examining the association between audit fees and accruals, by 
documenting a positive fees-accruals association (e.g., Frankel, Johnson and Nelson 2002, 
Kinney, Palmrose and Scholz 2004). Second, I find the positive association between audit 
fees and accruals are further magnified when firms are from weak legal regimes. This is 
consistent with my second hypothesis, implying that the fee premium associated with 
increased level of accruals is stronger for firms in countries with weak legal institutions. 
This finding is also consistent with the “risk pricing” reasoning for my first hypothesis. 
This is because, if the positive fees-accruals association is due to economic bond between 
auditor and client, then clients from counties with strong legal regimes need to pay 
greater additional fees to “bribe” auditors since auditors have higher possibilities to be 
caught and once being caught the penalties will be much more expensive under such legal 
environments. If this is the case, the positive fees-accruals association should be further 
strengthened under strong legal environments other than from weak legal regimes. 
In addition to testing the relationship between audit fees and accruals, I further 
investigate the causality for the association: why are audit fees positively associated with 
accruals? Is it due to “economic bonding” between auditor and client? Or is it mainly 
driven by “risk pricing” reasoning? To disentangle these two theories, I run an additional 
test. I partition the full sample into two sub-groups based on the sign of discretionary 
accruals: positive discretionary accruals sample (income increasing) and negative 
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discretionary accruals sample (income decreasing). If the fees-accruals association is 
driven by lack of audit independence, then firms with income increasing accruals may 
have greater incentives to “bribe” auditors compared to firms with income decreasing 
accruals. In response, I should observe the following: (a) stronger association with the 
positive accrual sample and/or (b) little or insignificant association with the negative 
accruals sample. I find significant and positive association between audit fees and 
accruals for both groups and the association is not statistically smaller for the negative 
accruals sub-sample. These results do not support the view that lack of independence is 
the source of higher magnitude of accruals. Based on this analysis, I argue that the 
positive association between audit fees and accruals is more likely driven by the “risk 
pricing” reasoning, which posits that auditors charge higher fees to conduct more audits 
or to compensate for greater risk for clients with higher level of discretionary accruals. In 
other words, my findings do not support the view that independence in-fact is impaired 
by excessive audit fees. 
I also investigate the impacts of the Big 4 auditors on the fees-accruals association 
across different legal regimes. As in many previous studies, the Big 4 auditors are found 
to play a critical role in audit pricing (e.g., Choi et al. 2008, Francis and Taylor 1995, 
DeFond et al. 2000) and exert significant impacts on accruals (e.g., Becker et al. 1998, 
Choi et al. 2003). My results show that the Big 4 auditors charge a greater fee premium to 
firms with high accrual levels than non-Big 4 auditors do. More interestingly, I find that 
the Big 4 auditors charge greater fee premiums to firms with higher accruals, and these 
premiums are even bigger for firms from countries with weak investor protections. 
 - 12 - 
 
Further, I conduct a variety of robustness checks to see whether my results are 
sensitive to alternative fee metrics used, alternative measures of legal institutions 
employed and potential endogeneity bias. I find that these results are largely consistent 
with my major findings and lend additional support to my hypotheses.  
 
Additional results 
In my first stage of analysis, I use magnitude of accruals to proxy for audit 
independence in-fact and test its association with audit fees. I find a positive association 
between audit fees and accruals, and further analysis suggests this association is more 
inclined to be driven by “risk pricing” reasoning rather than “economic bonding” 
arguments. In practice, audit independence has been perceived as threatened by economic 
dependence of audit fees on clients. Contrary to common belief, my results do not 
suggest that excessive audit fees reduce audit independence in-fact. 
In my second stage of analysis, I extend the previous analysis by examining 
whether audit independence in-appearance is impaired by large audit fees. Stated another 
way, do investors view large audit fees as impairing audit independence and lowering 
audit quality? Examining the economic consequences of audit fees in the context of firm 
valuation, I use Tobin’s Q to proxy for investor’s perception on audit independence (or 
audit independence in-appearance). Following the common belief, if investors view large 
audit fees as greater economic bond between auditor and client, bigger possibilities for 
auditors to succumb to client pressure (Nelson et al. 2002) and thus impaired audit 
independence, then credibility of financial reporting will decrease, information risk will 
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increase and firm valuation will be discounted. I therefore predict a negative association 
between excessive audit fees and firm value.  
I find firms with large audit fees actually enjoy higher firm valuation. Stated other 
way, investors attach a positive value to firms with higher audit fees. In addition, I find 
the country-level legal regime plays an important role in the association between audit 
pricing and firm value. Specifically, the valuation premium assigned to large audit fees is 
bigger for firms from countries with weak legal institutions. This result can also be 
interpreted  in such a way that firm-level governance mechanisms, such as audits with 
high quality, and country-level governance mechanisms, such as rule of law or investor 
protection strength, play a substitutive role (other than a complementary role) in firm 
valuation. 
This evidence of the market attaching higher value to firms with large audit fees 
can be interpreted with two scenarios. Firstly, investors are misled and the finding of 
pricing of large audit fees (measured by unexpected audit fees, or UAF) is the evidence 
of market mispricing. Secondly, on average, managers may legitimately use their 
accounting discretion to convey private information about future profitability to investors, 
and accruals thus capture managers’ incentive to communicate proprietary information. 
As such, the fee premium charged by auditors for clients with higher level of accruals 
may actually reflect value relevant information to investors.  And this explains why 
investors attach a positive value to UAF. 
To distinguish between the two alternative explanations, I further test whether 
UAF helps to predict future profitability. My finding shows that UAF is significantly 
associated with a firm’s future CFO, which is consistent with the second scenario. In 
 - 14 - 
 
addition, I also find that the ability of UAF to predict future CFO is more pronounced for 
firms from countries with civil law or weak legal enforcement and investor protections. 
Taken together, my results do not support the market mispricing view. 
Taken as a whole, I find the primary results as following: (1) Audit fees are 
positively associated with accruals. (2) The fees-accruals association varies when legal 
regimes shift across countries. Specifically, the positive fees-accruals association is more 
pronounced when firms are from weak legal regimes. (3) The market attaches positive 
value to firms with large audit fees. (4) The valuation premium associated with large 
audit fees is further magnified when firms are from weak legal regimes. (5) Excessive 
audit fees help to predict future cash flows. (6) The Big 4 charge bigger fee premium for 
clients with large accruals. (7) The Big 4’s fee premium assigned to clients with large 
accruals is further magnified when clients are from weak legal regimes. 
 
Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to literature in the several notable ways. First, this 
study contributes to the literature on the role of legal institutions on audit pricing. As 
noted by Choi et al. (2008), there is a great lack of research concerning the impacts of 
legal regimes on audit pricing behavior. Choi et al. (2008) investigate determinants of 
audit fees with international data. In addition to the common fee determinants (such as 
client size, client complexity and risk) documented in extant auditing literature, they 
firstly show that the significant differences of legal environments can help explain the 
variances of audit fees across countries, and they further point out that legal regime is 
another key determinant of audit fees. In their study, Choi et al. (2008) use only the 
 - 15 - 
 
single proxy to measure the strength of legal environment, which is the litigation risk of a 
country (Wingate Litigation Index 1997).4  Although Choi et al. (2008) move the audit 
fees studies one step forward, the way through which legal institutions affect audit 
pricing largely remains unknown: Do other legal institutions (litigation risk captures only 
one aspect of legal regimes) impact audit fees? And how? To fill this gap and to extend 
Choi et al. (2008), I use three alternative measures to proxy for legal institutions. I not 
only consider the impact of rule of law, but also take into account the strength of investor 
protection rights and legal enforcement. In addition, I include another measure that is 
CLUSTER, which summarizes a country’s legal institutional characteristics in different 
dimensions, to proxy for equity market development, ownership structures, strength of 
investor rights and legal enforcement.  I argue that I measure legal environments in a 
more comprehensive way and therefore my results yield greater reliability and 
generalization. 
More importantly, to enhance our understanding of auditor pricing behavior, I 
examine whether auditors take account magnitude of accruals into pricing decisions 
across countries. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to test the fees-
accruals association under an international environment. With data from 13 countries, I 
am able to investigate how the fees-accruals association varies when legal and 
institutional environment changes significantly across countries. Prior studies in this area 
typically use single country samples from countries that maintain strong legal regimes, 
such as the United States, United Kingdom and Australia. My data considers legal 
regimes varying from weak (such as Malaysia) to strong (such as US), and thus provides 
                                                          
4
 The Wingate Litigation Index (1997) is a risk rating across countries developed by an international 
insurance underwriter for one of the Big 4 accounting firms. The rating represents the “risk of doing 
business as an auditor” in a specific country. 
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better opportunity to observe the audit pricing behavior under different legal regimes. My 
study shows that when making pricing decisions, auditors include country-level legal 
regime into consideration, and the strength of legal institutions tend to influence the way 
that auditors price accruals.  
Secondly, this study contributes to the line of research examining the association 
between audit fees and earnings quality. Most previous research fails to yield a consistent 
result on the association between audit pricing and earnings quality.  My findings add to 
the mixed results and suggest there is a positive association between audit fees and 
accruals. In addition, I extend my analysis to explore the causality between audit fees and 
accruals. In particular, why audit fees are positively associated with accruals? My results 
shed light on the unresolved causality issue in most previous studies, and do not the 
support the view that the positive association between audit fees and accruals is driven by 
impaired audit independence. Taken together, findings of this study may provide useful 
insight into contradictory literature and current regulatory debates on auditor’s economic 
dependence on clients. 
Thirdly, evidence in this study may enhance understanding in the nature of audit 
service. The results are inconsistent with several pervasive views on audit fees and audit 
independence. I find that (1) the observed positive association between audit fees and 
accruals should be interpreted with an alternative explanation other than the longstanding 
“economic bonding” theory.  My results support the view that auditors assign higher fees 
to clients with large accruals because they perceive greater audit risk with such clients. 
As a response, an auditor may charge additional fees to cover additional work needed or 
to compensate for increased potential risk. This finding adds to the recent emerging 
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literature, showing that auditors are responsive to increased level of accruals (e.g., 
Schelleman et al. 2010).  I also find that (2) large audit fees have been attached with 
market value, which is contradictory to SEC’s concern and argument that excessive audit 
fees may erode an auditor’s independence-in-appearance. Additionally, I find the fact that 
large audit fees are priced by the market is because audit fees can improve value 
relevance of reported earnings and help predict future profitability.  
Finally, findings of this study may be interesting to government policy makers 
and standard setters. The turbulent events of global financial crisis have highlighted the 
critical importance of credible, high-quality financial reporting throughout the world. To 
enhance the quality and uniformity of accounting and auditing practice across the world 
and strengthen the public confidence in global financial reporting, the International 
Accounting Standard Board (“IASB”) and International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (“IAASB”) are working to develop a single set of high-quality globally 
accepted international financial reporting standards (“IFRS”) and international standards 
on auditing (“ISA”). Recent studies show evidence of improved financial reporting 
quality and reduced cost of equity capital with implementing IFRS (Li 2010). 
Despite the great incentives of IASB and IAASB, the goal of harmonizing 
accounting and auditing standards internationally may be hard to achieve in a world of 
diverse legal systems, considering the impacts of local legal systems, practice and 
enforcement. As a result, even introducing the same accounting and auditing standards 
around the globe would not guarantee the same level of financial reporting quality across 
countries because each country’s legal system may have different enforcement power and 
implementation processes. Along with other studies, this study provides new evidence on 
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the significant impacts of a nation’s legal regime on auditor behavior. Specifically, this 
study shows how a country’s legal and institutional environment influence managers’ 
financial reporting incentive and thus auditors’ assessments of audit risks, which 
consequently affect audit fees. 
To sum up, my findings have following implications: different from prior research, 
most of which use accrual measures to identify “bad behavior” of managers, this study 
shows that managers can choose to convey value-relevant information to investors 
through discretionary accruals with the given flexibility of GAAP. Accounting accruals 
are hard to audit and raise higher engagement risk to auditors. Auditors have the best 
position to access proprietary information and assess client’s accrual level, and thus 
incorporate their assessment into additional audit fees. As a result, these additional fees 
actually capture managers’ value-relevant information, which is value relevant and helps 
predict future profitability. Investors can see through this phenomenon and finally price it. 
With regard to different audit pricing mechanism across countries, a country’s 
litigation risk is a key determinant of audit fees. In addition, a country’s legal 
environment may influence a manager’s reporting incentive and accrual choices. This is 
reflected into an auditor’s assessment of audit risks and thus affects audit fees. Therefore, 
country-level legal regimes play a critical role on the association between audit fees and 
accruals. 
Referring to the economic consequences of large audit fees in the context of firm 
value, large audit fees are attached with value by the market and the valuation premium is 
further magnified when firms are from weak legal regimes. This could also be interpreted 
as the firm-level governance mechanisms, such as high quality audit, and country-level 
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governance mechanism, such as rule of law or legal regimes, play a substitutive role 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: 
Legal Origins, Accounting Information and Corporate Governance 
The theoretical basis of this thesis is based on Legal Origins Theory. Thus, in this 
section, I summarize the main studies in this area and the research linking the legal 
origins to accounting information properties, auditing practices and corporate governance 
as well.  
 
2.1 Legal Origins Theory 
About a decade ago, La Porta, Looez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny published a 
series of papers investigating legal origins and its economic consequences. Their studies 
document that legal rules protecting investors vary systematically among legal origins 
(i.e., common law vs. civil law), and these differences matter to economic outcomes 
(such as financial development, ownership structure, firm valuations, etc.).5  
Most legal scholars identify two primary secular legal traditions: common law 
and civil law, with the latter having four sub-traditions: French, German, Socialist, and 
Scandinavian. Through conquest and colonization, common and civil law were 
transplanted into much of the world. Countries using common law include England and 
its former colonies, including the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa and 
India. According to Mahoney (2001), “English common law developed because landed 
aristocrats and merchants wanted a system of law that would provide strong protections 
for property and contract rights, and limit the crown’s ability to interfere in markets.” The 
civil law legal tradition, however, originates in Roman law, which employs statutes and 
                                                          
5
 More specifically, La Porta et al. (1997, 1999, 2000) find that stronger investor protection laws lead to 
more developed financial markets. More developed financial markets are more likely to have greater 
external financing needs and opportunities, and more widespread ownership structure. 
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comprehensive codes, and relies heavily on legal scholars to determine the formulate 
rules. Contrary to common law, “French civil law developed as it did… to use state 
power to alter property rights and attempted to insure that judges did not interfere” 
(Mahoney 2001). 
Generally speaking, the fundamental differences between common and civil law 
origins are that common law tends to favor private control outcomes, while civil law 
leads to state-desired allocations. In addition, common law is “dispute resolving”, while 
civil law is “policy implementing.” Finally, common law stands for “unconditioned 
private contracting”, while civil law stands for “socially-conditioned private contracting.”  
 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny show how the different legal 
systems have survived and developed, and how the legal origins of countries and 
jurisdictions have pervasively influenced various aspects of their laws and regulations, 
which have greatly influenced their economic growth. In their review of their own paper 
and related research on the effects of the legal origins on institutions (laws and 
regulations) and institutions’ impact on economic outcomes, La Porta, Looez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2008) find that the economic consequences of legal origins are pervasive 
and substantial. They argue that compared with French civil law, “common law is 
associated with (a) better investor protection, which in turn is associated with improved 
financial development, better access to finance, and higher ownership dispersion, (b) 
lighter government ownership and regulation, which are in turn associated with less 
corruption, better functioning labor markets, and smaller unofficial economies, and (c) 
less formalized and more independent judicial systems, which are in turn associated with 
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more secure property rights and better contract enforcement” (La Porta, Looez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer 2008). 
There are, however, two main criticisms against Legal Origins Theory. First, there 
may be reverse causality of the impacts of legal origins on financial development: under 
political pressure from those investors, countries improve their investor protection laws 
when their financial markets develop. Second, there might be omitted variables, which 
mean that legal origins’ influence on financial development may not be through legal 
rules but other channels, such as contract enforcement and the quality of the judiciary. 
Despite these objections, La Porta, Looez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) believe that 
legal rules and regulations differ systematically across countries and the differences are 
largely due to legal origins; legal origins explain well why legal rules differ; and the 
measured differences in legal rules have substantial economic outcomes.  
 
2.2 Legal Origins and Accounting Information Properties 
 With respect to Legal Origins Theory and the availability of La Porta et al. 
(1997)’s legal variable data, a substantial volume of literature has investigated the 
properties of accounting information in a cross-country setting. Overall, these studies 
support that legal origin and its related institutions play an important role in explaining 
different accounting properties across countries. Previous studies mainly examine the 
following aspect of accounting information properties: (1) earnings management; (2) 
accounting conservatism; (3) value relevance of accounting information; and (4) 
corporate disclosure practices. 
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Earnings management 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), reporting flexibility allows managers to 
convey their private information about business prospects to stakeholders. And GAAP of 
any country provides a range of discretion in accounting choices to managers. 
Nevertheless, managers may take advantage of reporting flexibility and discretion to 
manipulate earnings for their own self-interest. Studies show that earning management 
occurs across countries and investor protection plays an important role in constraining 
earnings management around the world. 
An example of how legal regimes can influence accounting practices is shown in 
work of Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), who document that earnings management 
behavior is more pervasive in weak legal regimes. They argue that strong and well-
enforced outsider rights limit insider’s possession of private control benefits and thus 
reduce insider’s incentive to mask firm performance. In their analysis of systematic 
differences of earnings management behavior across 31 countries, they find that firms in 
countries with stronger investor rights and legal enforcements, tend to have more 
developed stock markets and dispersed ownership structure appear to have lower level of 
earnings management. However, Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2003) fail to find any 
significant association between legal origin and earnings opacity measures, in contrast to 
Leuz et al. (2003)’s finding that earnings management measures are significantly and 
positively correlated with investor rights. 
Using a comprehensive sample of both public and private European firms, 
Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006) find that earnings management is more pervasive in 
private firms than in public ones and in countries with French and German legal 
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traditions, which originated from civil law, a legal system that is considered to provide 
weaker investor protection. Lang, Raedy and Wilson (2006) find that cross-listed non-US 
firms from weaker legal regimes tend to have greater tendency to manage earnings and 
reduced value relevance of accounting information. Haw et al. (2004) find a significant 
and negative association between control-cash flow divergence measures, such as voting 
rights vs. cash flow rights, and income management proxy in common law countries with 
stronger investor protection. They also observe that it is not just legal institutions that 
constrain earnings management, but that it can be reduced by extra-legal institutions, 
such as tax compliance. 
Generally speaking, prior research shows that investor protection plays an 
important role in mitigating earnings management behavior around the world. 
 
Accounting conservatism 
According to Basu (1997)’s interpretation of conservatism, earnings reflect bad 
news more quickly than good news, since accountants are more likely to require a higher 
degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad news. Watts (2003a, 2003b) 
reviews the empirical evidence concerning accounting conservatism and proposes four 
possible explanations for prevalence of conservatism, which are contracting, litigation, 
taxation and regulation.  
 Influenced by these studies, there is a growing literature investigating the role of 
legal protection on accounting conservatism. For example, Ball et al. (2000) find that 
accounting is conservative in all their sample countries, while the magnitude of 
conservatism is higher in common law countries. Common law countries are 
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characterized with more dispersed ownership, and information asymmetry in these 
countries solved through publicly disclosed accounting information. Thus stakeholders 
demand more conservative accounting to protect themselves. On the other hand, civil law 
countries with more concentrated ownership resolve information asymmetry by 
developing a closer relationship with stakeholders, which reduces the demand for both 
public accounting information and accounting conservatism. Ball et al. (2007) 
investigates the primary reasons for accounting conservatism. Their results find a 
significant and positive relation between debt market size and timely loss recognition 
measures, which support the perspective that accounting conservatism is mainly driven 
by contracting motivation. 
Generally speaking, primary findings of literature in this stream show that firms 
in common law countries incorporate economic losses earlier than firms in civil law 
countries. 
 
Value relevance  
There is a growing literature investigating the role of legal institutions on value 
relevance of accounting. For example, Ali and Hwang (2000) investigate the relationship 
between the value relevance of accounting information and country-level institutional 
factors. They find that value relevance of financial reporting is lower for countries with 
bank dominated economy, with high tax-book conformity, with low spending on auditing, 
with private sector bodies are excluded in accounting standard, with accounting practices 
following continental model. Hung (2001) investigates the role of investor protection on 
value relevance of accrual accounting. She argues that the use of accruals provides 
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managers the opportunity to manage earnings, which is exacerbated by weak investor 
protection. And she finds in countries with weak investor protection, accrual choices are 
negatively associated with value relevance of accounting information. Furthermore, this 
negative association is alleviated in strong investor protection regime. Her findings 
support that investor protection improves the effectiveness of accrual accounting.  
 DeFond, Hung and Trezevant (2007) examine the cross-country differences in 
market reaction to earnings announcements, and thus find that annual earnings 
announcements have greater information content in countries with stronger investor 
protection. 
Young and Guenther (2003) propose that information disclosure will make 
acquiring a company’s specific information less costly and thus result in increased 
foreign investment, and thus find support for this proposition: a significant positive 
association between legal origins and disclosure level. Thus, the strong legal protection 
offered to foreign investors may drive the international capital mobility. 
To sum up, international studies concerning value relevance of accounting show 




Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that due to the dispersion of ownership, it is 
costly for each shareholder to monitor the managers who have a tendency to become 
entrenched and expropriate investors’ benefits. In order to solve this agency problem, 
optimal contracts between managers and investors require disclosure of relevant 
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information to help investors evaluate managers’ performance. Healy and Palepu (2001) 
point out as well that public disclosure plays a critical role in the efficient functioning of 
capital market by mitigating agency conflicts between managers and dispersed investors. 
Bushman et al. (2004) document that corporate transparency, defined as the availability 
of firm specific information to the outside publicly traded firms, is higher in countries 
with a legal system based on common law combined with a highly efficient judiciary.  
Shi, Magnan and Kim (2012) employ a costs-and-benefits framework to 
investigate the determinants and consequences of voluntary disclosure practices by 
foreign firms cross-listed in the US. The results show that a firm’s home-country legal 
institutions play a key role in determining its voluntary disclosure and governance 
practices when the firm transfers into US capital market. Specifically, likelihood of 
voluntary disclosure increases as cross-listed firms are from stronger home-country 
institutions, lower home-country-level ownership concentrations, and greater levels of 
product internationalization. 
Overall, cross country evidence show that legal origins are important in 
explaining the variation in disclosure levels.  
 
2.3 Legal Origins and Audit Practices 
In the line of international auditing research, a number of emerging studies test 
the issue how auditing practices, such as audit quality, audit pricing and audit demand, 
differ based on different legal systems. For example, Choi et al. (2008) provide cross 
country evidence on audit pricing. In their analysis, they use the Wingate Litigation Index 
as a proxy for legal regime. They find a country’s litigation risk is important to audit 
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pricing and they find that audit fees increases as the country-level litigation risk 
strengthens. They also point out the Big 4 auditors charge a fee premium in a given legal 
environment and the Big 4 fee premium decreases as the legal regime becomes stronger. 
Jaggi and Low (2009) revisit the issue regarding the association between 
institutional environment and audit fees. They argue not only investor protection rights 
can impact audit fees, securities regulation shall also be taken into consideration. Similar 
to Choi et al. (2008), they find that audit fees is positively associated with investor 
protection, which is captured by La Porta et al. (1998)’s anti-director rights index. 
Furthermore, they document that stricter securities regulation is associated with higher 
audit fees, especially in countries with lower investor protection. And they do not find 
such an association in countries with high investor protection. 
Focusing on earnings quality, Francis et al. (2008) investigate Big 4 audit quality 
based on country-level investor protection regimes. This paper mainly tests whether the 
role of the Big 4 vs. non-Big 4 in improving earnings quality varies with the different 
investor protection regimes of various countries. It shows that only the Big 4 increase 
their audit quality as legal and regulatory regime becomes stronger. Non-Big 4 auditors, 
however, do not change their quality significantly whether or not a country has a weaker 
or stronger legal system. 
With regard to auditor industry specialization, Kwon, Lim and Tan (2007) find 
that industry specialist auditors impose higher accrual quality and earnings response 
coefficient to their clients around the world. They show the impact of auditor industry 
specialization on earnings quality depends on the strength of legal environments, and the 
effect of industry specialization is more salient in weaker legal regime. 
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 In their study of private demand of audit in both developed and developing 
countries, Francis, Khurana, Martin and Pereira (2008) document that country-level 
institutional factors are important to explain the differences in voluntary audits. 
 
2.4 Legal Origins and Corporate Governance 
A number of studies document cross-country variations in accounting practices 
and that the effects of accounting and corporate governance are associated with country-
level institutional factors (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998, 2000; Hung 2000; Leuz et al. 2003; 
Francis et al. 2003). In addition, some finance research find that legal institutions matter a 
lot to corporate governance practices.  For example, Durnev and Kim (2005) and Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz (2007) both investigate the role of country-level factors and firm-level 
incentives in determining a firm’s governance structure.  
Durnev and Kim (2005) argue that firm-level governance mechanisms and 
country-level institutions are substitutes. Firm-level incentive is more important to firms 
in countries with weak investor protection, and voluntary improvement in governance can 
serve as a substitute for weak institutions. On the other hand, in countries with strong 
investor protection, country-level institutions can provide sufficient protection for 
contracting parties (i.e., bankruptcy protection), and thus investors have less to gain from 
voluntary governance improvement. Durnev and Kim (2005) find that firms with greater 
growth opportunities and greater financing needs have higher-quality governance and 
disclose more in weak legal regimes. Similarly, Fan and Wong (2004) find that in the low 
investor protection regimes of the emerging economy, firms with more agency problems 
and financing needs are more likely to employ Big 4 auditors. Choi and Wong (2007) 
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examine whether the governance role of auditors is based on the strength of a country’s 
legal system and conclude that external auditors generally play a more important 
governance function in countries with weak legal institutions. 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) support the notion that firm-level incentives and 
country factors are more likely to be complements. They argue the net payoff of 
governance structure improvement is lower in weak legal regime countries due to lack of 
credibility. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) find that firm factors are more important in 
developed economies with strong institutions.  
 
 2.5 Conclusion 
Based on numerous prior studies, there exists great impacts of legal origins and 
related legal institutions on the properties of accounting information (e.g., earnings 
management, accounting conservatism, value relevance, and corporate disclosure), 
auditing and corporate governance practices. This dissertation aims to investigate the role 
of legal origins and related institutions on audit pricing. Therefore, in an international 
study context, the country-level institutions and their impacts should be taken into 
consideration. 
In their review of how the economic effects of financial accounting information 
vary with other factors, Bushman and Smith (2001)6 propose a theoretical framework to 
link the financial accounting regime and other institutional characteristics. These 
institutional characteristics include the auditing regime, the communication infrastructure, 
analyst following, the financial architecture, the legal environment, corporate control 
                                                          
6 Bushman and Smith (2001) propose that cross-country analyses are one promising way to assess the 
effects of financial accounting information on economic performance. 
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mechanisms, industry concentration, political influence over business activities and 
human capital. 
Among all the above-mentioned institutional characteristics, this dissertation 
focuses on specifically audit fees and legal institutions, investigating how they jointly 
affect financial reporting quality and firm valuation. Based on Bushman and Smith 
(2001)’s framework, I explore the conceptual model for this study, as depicted in 
FIGURE 1. 
The conceptual model illustrates the relationship among audit pricing, legal 
institutions and a manager’s accrual choices. A country’s legal institutions influence a 
manager’s reporting incentives and thus auditor assessment of risks, which in turn affects 
audit fees and the fees-accruals association. In addition, with regard to the economic 
consequences of large audit fees in the context of firm value, this study jointly examines 
the roles of a nation’s legal institutions and audit fees in market valuation. 
 
 [INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
In this section, I review prior studies related to the dissertation topic and 
categorize literature review with following four streams of research: (1) determinants of 
audit fees; (2) unexpected audit fees; (3) audit fees and earnings quality; and (4) legal 
regime and auditing. Using the exhaustive review on prior studies as conceptual 
foundations, I put forward research hypotheses at the end of this section.  
 
3.1 Audit Fee Determinants 
In this section, focusing on a number of milestone audit fee studies, I review the 
development of audit fee model and the history of increasing population of audit fee 
determinants. 
Over the past three decades, a large body of research has examined the 
determinants of audit fees mostly following original work by Simunic (1980). Simunic 
(1980) hypothesized that certain determinants would be related to cross-sectional 
differences in the level of audit fees, since such determinants drive an auditor to carry out 
more or less work when conducting the audit. After discussing with representatives of 
Big 8 accounting firms and representatives of a few liability issuer for accountants, 
Simunic (1980) presented a positive model of process by which audit fees were 
determined. He proposed a number of general factors as possible determinants of audit 
fees as following: (a) size of the auditee, (b) operation complexity of the auditee, (c) 
auditing problems related to specific financial statement components, (d) industry of the 
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auditee, and (e) form of ownership (specifically, whether the auditee is a publicly or 
closely held company). 
Following Simunic (1980), hundreds of published and working papers have 
examined a variety of factors associated with higher or lower levels of audit fees. Much 
of this research has provided abundant evidence that audit fees are generally determined 
by measures of client size, client complexity and client risk. These papers typically 
develop a model by regressing audit fees on a number of measures of possible fee drivers 
as following: 
 
LnAF is the natural logarithm of audit fees, and Di and Dk are two groups of 
potential fee determinants. Typically, the regression model includes one or a few new 
added testing variables Dk, plus a group of control variables Di which have been tested to 
be significant fee determinants in prior studies. 
Hay, Knechel and Wong (2006) conduct a meta-analysis on research published 
from 1977 to 2003, highlighting well over 100 audit fees.  Their meta-analysis helps to 
test the pervasiveness of independent variables (fee determinants) included in prior audit 
fees studies and helps to identify common fee drivers across studies, samples and 
countries. Hay, Knechel and Wong (2006) document that the population of explanatory 
variables in audit fee models has increased significantly since 1980. The average number 
of testing variables in the fee model pre-1990 was 7.7 and increased to 9.5 post-1990. 
They proceed to categorize the determinants of audit fees into the following categories: 
client attributes (size, complexity, inherent risk, profitability, leverage, form of ownership, 
internal control, governance, industry), auditor attributes (auditor quality, auditor tenure, 
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auditor location) and engagement attributes (report lag, busy seasons, audit problems and 
non-audit fees). 
Based on the meta-analysis of Hay, Knechel and Wong (2006), the most common 
and significant determinants of audit fees across studies, samples and countries are as 
following: 
 (1) Client size. Size is a significant explanatory variable for audit fees across 
most published studies. Size is typically measured as total assets or total revenues.7 The 
meta-analysis supports the positive association of size with audit fees.  
(2) Client complexity. A positive relationship between client complexity and audit 
fees is expected: The more complex the client, the harder it is to audit, the more hours 
needed to conduct the audit and the higher the audit fees. Empirical studies find 
significant results support the positive relationship between measures of client 
complexity and audit fees. Typical surrogates for client complexity are the number of 
subsidiaries (this measurement has the strongest result), the number of foreign 
subsidiaries, the proportion of foreign assets, the number of business segments (this 
measurement is with the weakest result), etc.   
(3) Inherent risk. Inherent risk is expected to be positively related to audit fees 
since certain parts of audit may incur higher risk of error and need specialized audit 
procedures, such as the audit of inventories and receivables (Simunic 1980; Newton and 
Ashton 1989; Stice 1991). The analysis shows that inherent risk is a critical fee driver and 
the sum of inventories and receivables is a good proxy for inherent risk.  
                                                          
7
 Most studies take the natural logarithm of total assets (or revenues) to improve the linearity with audit 
fees. 
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(4) Profitability. Profitability is a measure of risk as well and represents the extent 
of loss liability that auditor face when clients have bad financial conditions.  It is 
expected to have a negative association with audit fees: the worse the client financial 
performance, the higher risk auditor bear and the higher the audit fees. Typical measures 
for profitability are a dummy variable indicating the existence of a loss and a profitability 
ratio (ROA). Post-1990 studies indicate that the loss variable has become an important 
determinant of audit fees.  
(5) Leverage. Leverage is another measure of risk and captures the liability loss 
that auditor is expose to. The meta-analysis supports the positive association between 
leverage ratio (total liability to total assets ratio) and audit fees. 
Beginning with Simunic (1980), a variety of studies has tested the determinants of 
audit fees with single-country samples across countries. Different from prior studies, 
Choi, Kim, Liu and Simunic (2008) conduct a cross-country research to test how the legal 
regime of a country affects cross-country variations of audit fees. Audit fees are expected 
to have a positive relationship with the strength of a country’s legal regime. This is 
because, within a stronger legal environment, auditors are exposed to higher litigation 
liability in case of an audit failure, which leads to a higher fee premiums to compensate 
for additional risk or greater motivations for auditors to expend more effort. Based on 
prior audit fee models, Choi, Kim, Liu and Simunic (2008) regress audit fees on a series 
of control variables which are mostly proved to be significant fee determinants in prior 
studies, plus a new country-level explanatory variable REGIME.8 Controlling for other 
possible audit fee drivers that include the client-specific risk measures (such as, LOSS, 
                                                          
8
 Choi, Kim, Liu and Simunic (2008) use the country-level litigation risk index from Wingate (1997) as 
their measure of REGIME. 
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ROA, and LEVERAGE), regression results show that country-specific litigation risk is 
significantly and positively related to audit fees. This finding supports the view that the 
strength of a country’s legal environment is a substantially critical driver to determine the 
differences in levels of audit fees across countries. 
Based on the results of over 30 years’ extant audit fee research and the crucial 
meta- analysis, taken as a whole, the differences in audit fees across firms and countries 
may be largely explained by measures of client size, client complexity, client risk and 
country-level litigation risk.  
Following the large body of prior studies on audit fee determinants, I use different 
measures of client size, client complexity and client risk to capture common factors that 
are deemed to explain audit pricing. In addition, because this study is international in 
scope, I include country-level factors, such as litigation risks and GDP per capita, to 
capture variances in audit fees across countries. 
 
3.2 Unexpected Audit Fees 
Audit fees may be divided into two components, as shown in the following 
equation: expected audit fees (or normal level of audit fees) and unexpected audit fees (or 
abnormal audit fees). Cross-sectional differences in expected audit fees are driven by 
differences in audit cost, which mainly include effort cost and expected legal cost 
(Simunic 1980; Choi, Kim, Liu and Simunic 2008). Therefore, unexpected audit fees are 
the difference between total level of audit fees and expected level of audit fees. 
         Audit feeit = (Expected audit fees it) + (Unexpected audit fees it) 
                           = (Effort costit) + (Expected legal costit) + (Unexpected audit fees it) 
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As indicated in prior literature, effort cost and expected legal cost are determined 
by following common factors across firms: client size, client complexity, client risk and 
legal regime. Typically, an estimation model is developed by regressing total level of 
audit fees on a set of above-mentioned common factors which are deemed to be 
associated with audit fees. The model takes the form as following: 
 
UAF is measured by the residual term  taken from the model. Specifically, UAF 
is the portion of audit fees that cannot be explained by the common types of fee 
determinants. Controlling the impacts of these known determinants, UAF are expected to 
capture idiosyncratic contractual relationships between auditors and clients. Recently, 
increasingly more papers begin to use UAF to proxy for audit independence (e.g., Hope 
and Langli 2010, Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, and Lobo 2010). A few studies have tested 
the relation between UAF and earnings quality and find consistent positive association 
between positive unexpected audit fees and accruals (e.g., Hope et al. 2008; Hribar et al. 
2010; Choi et al. 2010). 9   
The UAF metric is a better surrogate to audit independence than total audit fees. 
Total audit fees may include other innate firm characters, such as size and complexity, 
which are determined by common factors across clients, while unexpected audit fees are 
determined by specific contractual relationship between auditor and client, which avoid 
the above-mentioned noises (e.g., Hribar et al. 2010, Choi et al. 2010). 
The UAF metric may better capture threats to auditor independence than non-
audit fee measures, if there exists any. In their discussion of Frankel et al. (2002), Kinney 
                                                          
9
 Hope, Kang, Thomas, and Yoo (2008) employ cost of equity capital (implied rate of return) as a measure 
of perceived earnings quality. They find in strong investor protection countries, IRR is increasing with 
excess unexpected audit fees.  
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and Libby (2002) doubt whether non-audit fees can properly capture the lack of auditor 
independence and posit that “unexpected non-audit fees and audit fees may more 
accurately be likened by attempted bribes” and “unexpected fees may also better capture 
the profitability of the services provided.” Similarly, in the discussion paper of Choi et al. 
(2008), Magnan (2008) argues that audit fees should consist of legal cost, effort cost and 
partner’s profits.10 The unexpected audit fees might be more associated with partner’s 
profits. In addition, some studies argue that fee dependence is inherent in audit-client 
contracting, and thus audit and non-audit fees should provide similar incentives to 
auditors (e.g., Hansen and Watts 1997, Reynolds and Francis 2001). Therefore, the 
economic bond tends to be irrelevant concerning whether fees are from audit service or 
non-audit service. Even if auditors are inhibited from providing certain non-audit services 
to the same client after passing of SOX 2002, auditor independence still faces threats 
from excessively high levels of audit fees. 
Based on existing research on unexplained audit fees, I expect unexplained audit 
fees as a better indicator to capture idiosyncratic auditor-client relation. Thus, I include 
the UAF as an alternative audit fee metric and use it in my robustness check analysis. 
 
3.3 Audit Fees and Earnings Quality 
In this section, I first summarize the main findings of prior extant literature 
examining the relationship between the amount (and type) of audit fees and earnings 
quality (hereafter the fee-quality association). Second, I proceed to discuss possible 
explanations for the reasons why prior studies fail to yield conclusive results on the fee-
                                                          
10
 Audit feeit = f [(Effort costit) + (Expected legal costit) + (Partner’s profit it)] 
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quality association. Finally, I discuss the causality issue existing between audit fees and 
accruals. 
 
3.3.1 Mixed results: Audit Fees and Earnings Quality  
Auditors lend credibility to clients’ prepared financial statements and auditors 
collect fees from their clients, which obviously create a potential threat for audit 
independence. A series of high profile financial scandals involving Enron and WorldCom 
and the collapse of Arthur Andersen have cast doubt on audit quality on ensuring the 
credibility of financial reporting. In response, the relationship between audit fees and 
earnings quality has received considerable attention by regulators, practitioners and 
academics. For example, the SEC stated its concern that auditors’ providing non-audit 
service and charging excessive high audit fees to clients may erode audit independence. 
In order to rebuild investors’ confidence on audit quality and capital market, Congress 
enacted SOX 2002 to prohibit auditors from providing certain non-audit services to 
clients. Along with this concern, a flood of accounting studies examine the relationship 
between audit fees and earnings quality by investigating whether fee-induced economic 
bond impair audit independence or not. However, prior studies provided insignificant or 
at best mixed results on the view that audit fees are associated with impaired audit 
independence.  
First of all, a long line of research finds a negative association between audit fees 
/ non-audit fees and different measures of earnings quality, supporting the perspective 
that audit independence is impaired through fee dependence. Frankel et al. (2002) 
document audit fees to be positively associated with discretionary accruals (which have 
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the opposite sign to earnings quality). Sengupta and Shen (2007), Hribar et al. (2010) and 
Choi et al. (2010) document a significant association between auditors charging higher 
audit fees and clients with poor accruals quality. Kenney et al. (2004) show that firms 
with higher audit fees generally have greater likelihood of accounting restatements. 
Secondly, another stream of studies documents opposing results and finds a positive 
association between audit pricing and earnings quality, implying that high audit fees do 
not necessarily impair audit independence. For example, Srinidhi and Gul (2007) argue 
that higher audit fees should represent more audit effort and document a significant 
positive association between audit fees and accruals quality. Finally, a few studies fail to 
find any significant relationship between the two. Craswell et al. (2002) find that level of 
auditor fee dependence does not affect an auditor’s propensity to qualify their audit 
opinions. DeFond et al. (2002) find no association between non-audit fees and an 
auditor’s propensity to issue going concern audit opinions. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and 
Larker and Richardson (2004) do not document any significant link either. 
Prior studies on non-audit fees and financial reporting quality provide mixed 
results, implying that the non-audit fees metric may not be a good proxy for auditor 
independence. Most studies use non-audit fees to capture economic bond or auditor 
independence, and thus audit quality. Simunic (1984) theoretically shows that when an 
auditor provides both audit and non-audit services to a client, the auditor can save a 
portion of the costs from “knowledge spillover” effects and be economically bonded to 
the client. An auditor who is concerned about the loss of non-audit fee revenue is less 
likely to object to a manager’s accounting choices and more likely to go along with 
client’s earnings management behavior. An opposing hypothesis argues that the provision 
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of non-audit services will not impair audit independence. Since it increases an auditor’s 
investment in reputational capital, the auditor is less likely to take the risk to satisfy one 
specific client’s demands (e.g., Dopuch, King and Schwartz 2003). 
According to these competing hypotheses, the empirical results as to whether or 
not the provision of non-audit fees impairs auditor independence and financial reporting 
quality are mixed. These studies use various measures to capture reporting quality which 
include the magnitude of earnings management (accruals quality) (e.g., Frankel, Johnson 
and Nelson 2002, Antle et al. 2002, Ashbaugh, Lafond and Mayhew 2003, Chung and 
Kallapur 2003, Francis and Ke 2003, Lacker and Richardson 2004), restatements (e.g., 
Kinney, Palmrose and Scholz 2004), the propensity of auditors to issue going-concern 
opinions (e.g., Craswell, Stokes and Laughton 2002, DeFond, Raghunandan and 
Subramanyam 2002), and accounting conservatism (Ruddock, Taylor and Taylor 2006). 
In the context of earnings management, Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) report a 
significant and positive association between the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees and 
the magnitude of discretionary accruals and interpret the results as evidence that 
provision of non-audit services reduces auditor independence and lowers earnings quality. 
Ashbaugh, Lafond and Mayhew (2003) find that after controlling for performance, the 
non-audit fee metric is insignificantly associated with discretionary accruals. Lacker and 
Richardson (2004) also find that the results of Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) are 
limited to a subset of smaller, management-controlled firms. With respect to audit 
opinions, Craswell, Stokes and Laughton (2002) find that the level of auditor fee 
dependence does not affect auditor propensity to qualify their audit opinions; DeFond, 
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Raghunandan and Subramanyam (2002) find no association between non-audit fees and 
an auditor’s propensity to issue going concern audit opinions.  
 
3.3.2 Why No Conclusive Result? 
Why do most prior studies fail to yield a conclusive result on the fee-quality 
association? There are at least three explanations for these conflicting evidences. First of 
all, theoretical background for the association between fees and audit independence is 
ambiguous (see Larcker and Richardson 2004). One line of research points out that 
excessive audit fees could increase the economic bonding between client and auditor, 
therefore high level of fees may provide auditors incentives to acquiesce to clients’ 
pressure and compromise their independence (DeAngelo 1981; Watts and Zimmerman 
1986). On the contrary, other research argues that costs related to litigation claim and 
related reputation loss may remind auditors to uphold audit independence (DeAngelo 
1981; Chung and Kallapur 2003). Thus, in the cost-benefit calculus, auditors do not only 
pursue greater fees but also take the cost of audit failure into account. In other words, 
auditors would trade off between the benefits and expected costs when considering 
compromise their independence in return for greater fees. This represents that high 
litigation risks and great fees have opposing effects on audit independence. The high 
litigious environment in most prior studies (such as US, UK and Australia) may offset the 
effects of fee dependence on earnings quality. As such, the reason that most prior studies 
document insignificant or mixed results on fee-quality association may due to this 
offsetting effect other than lacking of significant underlying relationship.  Thus, testing 
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fee-quality association with single-country sample (from strong legal regime) is an 
insufficient research setting.11  
Second, fee measures used in prior studies may be inappropriate to capture audit 
independence. Most prior studies use total fees (or total non-audit fees) or fee ratio (i.e., 
non-audit fee / total audit fee) to measure fee dependence. If the research purpose is to 
use these fee measures to capture the economic dependence of an auditor on a specific 
client, then these measures may not be able to act as good surrogates for an idiosyncratic 
auditor-client relationship. Based on extant auditing literature on audit fee determinants, 
the cross-sectional differences in audit fees are determined by common factors (fee 
drivers) across firms and countries, such as client size, client complexity, client risk and 
national legal regime. Even controlling for these possible influential determinants, total 
fees may still not be able to explicitly capture fee dependence without the influence of 
firm’s innate characters. As a result, the observed relation between total audit fees and 
earnings quality may be influenced or driven by client’s characters other than the specific 
auditor-client relationship.  
Third, most existing studies do not consider the asymmetric effects of audit fees 
on earnings quality. As noted by Choi et al. (2010), the association between abnormal 
audit fees (which is similar to the concept of UAF) and absolute discretionary accruals is 
asymmetric, depending on the sign of abnormal audit fees. They find a significant 
positive association between abnormal audit fees and the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals when the abnormal fees are positive. When abnormal audit fees are negative, 
they fail to find any significant association between the two. Choi et al. (2010) point out 
positive abnormal audit fees, which represent higher actual audit fees than normal level 
                                                          
11
 Hope et al. (2010) have similar arguments. 
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audit fees which, on the one hand, may create motivations for auditors to acquiesce to 
client pressure for substandard reporting and thus impair audit quality. On the other hand, 
when abnormal audit fees are zero or negative, auditors have fewer incentives to 
compromise audit quality. In response, if pool positive UAF and negative UAF together, 
the two opposing effects may cancel out each other and result in insignificant association 
with accruals quality.12 These results imply that prior studies fail to find any significant 
results may result from this asymmetric relation. 
 
3.3.3 Causality Issue between Audit Fees and Accruals  
In addition to mixed results documented in prior literature, two recent studies, 
Choi et al. (2010) and Hribar et al. (2010) find similar results and support the perspective 
that audit fees are positively related to magnitude of accruals. Despite consistent results 
documented in these studies, they propose two opposite reasoning to explain the positive 
association between audit fees and accruals. The two competing arguments to explain the 
causality between audit fees and accruals are the “economic bonding” theory and the 
“risk pricing” argument. 
 
Economic bonding: threat of audit independence 
There exists a pervasive view that audit independence (both independence in fact 
and independence in appearance) is threatened by economic dependence of an auditor on 
client fees. For example, DeAngelo (1981) argues that an auditor is more likely to 
                                                          
12
 Theoretically, positive abnormal audit fees can be viewed as so called “client-specific quasi-rents”, and 
the quasi-rents create incentives for auditors to compromise independence (DeAngelo 1981). With respect 
to negative abnormal audit fees, the situations are more complex. According to Choi et al. (2010), three 
possibilities may be expected for the association between negative abnormal audit fees and magnitude of 
accruals: insignificant, positive and negative. 
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compromise independence when the client is financially important. She states that “the 
existence of client-specific quasi-rents to incumbent auditors… lowers the optimal 
amount of auditor independence” Similarly, Magee and Tseng (1990) develop a multi-
period model and observe that significant economic rents may threaten auditor 
independence. Dye (1991) also theoretically shows that when clients pay unusually 
higher fees to auditors, auditors may reduce the quality of audit service. Survey results 
from Nelson, Elliott and Tarley (2002) and Trompeter (1994) are consistent with these 
arguments: the more economic bonding between auditor and client, the greater propensity 
of the auditor to acquiesce to client pressure. In terms of perceived audit independence, 
Schmidt (2011) points out that fee dependence is often related to an audit failure by 
attorneys of plaintiff in audit litigation. The attorneys argue that economic pressure to 
retain fees may erode an auditor’s independent mindset. In this case, auditors may not be 
objective, not be able to retain professional skepticism, and not be diligent when carrying 
out an audit. 
A variety of studies document empirical results supporting the argument in 
“economic bonding” theory. To name a few, Hope et al. (2008) and Choi et al. (2010) 
show that auditors have stronger economic dependence on clients with higher audit fees, 
and responsively the excess audit fees can act as a bribe to auditors. To retain these 
clients, auditors would compromise their independence and allow more earnings 
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Risk pricing: auditor’s proprietary information 
According to Simunic (1980)’s theoretical audit fee model, minimum audit cost is 
determined by: 
 
Where c is an auditor’s factor cost per unit of external audit resources to carry out 
the audit, q is the number of resources the auditor needs for the audit. Therefore,  
represents audit effort cost.  is the expected present value of future losses which 
may arise from incumbent audit;  is the possibility that auditor will pay for the 
losses. Thus  captures the present value of expected future losses faced by 
auditor for conducting the audit. Generally, these losses are related with litigation claims 
and associated reputation loss. To sum up, total audit cost consists of audit effort cost and 
expected future loss. 
Based on this model, when auditors perceive higher engagement risk through their 
proprietary information, on the one hand, they could choose to conduct more audit hours 
(increase q) and thus higher audit effort, which lead to higher audit fees. The higher audit 
fees are charged to cover additional audit cost needed to reduce the engagement risks to 
acceptable levels. On the other hand, higher engagement risk may bring in higher 
expected losses ( ). Thus, higher fees could be charged to 
compensate for additional risks that auditor face. In short, for firms with higher 
engagement risk, auditors may charge higher fees to compensate for more effort or more 
risk. 
Among other earning’s components, accruals are hard to observe and audit. 
Accounting accruals include a manager’s subjective estimate of future outcomes, which 
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cannot be verified until occur (Francis and Krishnan 2003). Auditors face significant 
risks of reputation loss and litigation claims when clients have high level of discretionary 
accruals.13 In response, when clients have higher level of discretionary accruals, auditors 
may charge a higher risk premium to compensate for additional risk they face. Auditors 
may also choose to dedicate additional time to the audit, resulting in higher audit fees to 
reduce their potential risk level (refer to Figure 2). Therefore, the positive fees-accruals 
association may not necessarily due to the impaired audit independence associated with 
greater fees. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
A few studies provide empirical results for the risk pricing argument. For example, 
Sengupta and Shen (2007) propose that client’s engagement in earnings management 
would increase the risk of accounting misstatements14, which would require more audit 
effort. Therefore, an auditor may charge its client higher fees to compensate for greater 
risk of financial losses or potential reputation loss. In addition, Hribar et al. (2010) point 
out that since auditors have access to firms’ management and be able to obtain 
proprietary information, they possess intimate knowledge and superior understanding of 
firms’ financial reporting. Auditors may be in the best position to identify firms with poor 
accounting quality and they may pass potential business risks to clients by pricing them 
into audit fees. Their reasoning is opposed to economic bonding theory:  the greater risks 
                                                          
13
 A most recent paper, Boone et al. (2011) find that firm’s abnormal accruals can increase an incumbent 
auditor’s litigation risk. 
14
 For example, Dechow et al. (2007) show that firms with lower accruals quality have greater possibility to 
be subject to SEC enforcement actions for earnings management. 
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that firms with poor accounting quality face, lead to higher audit fees.15 In other words, 
Hribar et al. (2010) suggest that the negative fee-quality association is not due to audit 
independence impairment. 
Taken together, even a significant positive association between audit fees and 
accruals is observed, there exists two-way causality to explain the cause and effect 
between the two: accrual choices may be determined by fees paid to auditors and audit 
fees may be influenced by clients ’accruals.  Therefore, in order to enhance our 
understanding in the nature of audit services, I not only investigate the question itself, 
that is, “what is the relationship between audit fees and accruals”, but also I proceed to 
explore the causality issue underneath the question, which is, “why are audit fees 
associated with accruals?”  
 
3.4 Legal Regime and Audit 
In Section 2, I have reviewed extensive body of literature on substantial impacts 
of legal origins and related institutions on capital market development, financing, 
corporate governance, and properties of earning quality across countries around the world. 
However, research on how legal regimes influence auditor behavior is greatly lacking 
(Choi et al. 2008). 
 In recent years, increasingly more researchers began to look at the role of 
litigation risk on audit fees, audit independence and audit quality. For example, using 
data from 15 countries around the world, Choi et al. (2008) show that litigation risks have 
                                                          
15
 However, Srinidhi and Gul (2007) find a positive association between audit fees and accruals quality. 
Their argument is as follows: higher audit fees would lead to superior quality audits, which would result in 
more informative accruals. 
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been priced into audit fees. Venkataraman et al. (2008) compare the differences of audit 
quality and audit fees for a special group of firms prior and post-IPOs. They find auditors 
have higher audit quality and higher audit fees when facing higher litigation risks. Bonnie 
et al. (2011) and Lee & Mande (2003) examine PSLRA 1995’s impact on audit quality. 
They both document a decrease of audit quality after the passage of the act.16 In addition, 
Boone et al. (2011) show that litigation risks could increase auditor incentives to restrain 
abnormal accruals, and abnormal accruals increase risk may increase the likelihood of 
auditor litigation.17 Schmidt (2011) find that non-audit fees are positively associated with 
accounting restatement that resulting in audit litigation, which implies that substantial 
audit fees is perceived by jurors as impaired audit independence.   
 
3.5 Hypotheses development 
Based on mixed results of previous studies, this studies aims to contribute to the 
literature by investigating the following question: Do audit fees price accruals? To 
explore this question, I further investigate two subsidiary questions: what is the 
association between audit fees and accruals? and are why audit fees related with accruals? 
To better answer these questions, I re-examine the relationship between audit fees 
and accruals. In this study, I predict there is a positive association between audit fees and 
accruals. In addition, I argue this positive association is due to above-mentioned “risk 
pricing” reasoning. My prediction is based on four primary reasons: First, accruals are 
different from other financial statement items and they are hard to detect and audit (Gul 
                                                          
16
 PSLRA1995 act is perceived as decrease litigation risks that auditors face. 
17
 Bonnie et al. (2011) focus on client-level litigation risk and document an endogeneity issue between 
accruals quality and litigation risks. This study investigates country-level litigation risk, which is an 
exogenous variable and may not be influenced by firm-level earnings quality. 
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2003, Francis and Krishnan 1999). Clients with higher level of accruals need more hours 
and effort to audit, and thus result in higher audit fees. Second, Simunic and Stein (1996) 
posit that large accruals represent more engagement uncertainty and thus increase audit 
risk. Auditors may charge higher fees to conduct more hours of audit to decrease 
detection risk to an acceptable level and /or simply charge a higher fee premium to 
compensate for potential future litigation. For example, Bedard and Johnstone (2004) 
find that auditors plan increased effort and billing rates (audit specialization) for clients 
with earnings manipulation risk. Third, the magnitude of accruals reflect a manager’s 
substantial discretion in choices of accounting methods and estimates and could represent 
two types of a manager’s reporting incentives. Some companies may use accruals for 
legitimate reasons, while others may misuse their discretion to manipulate earnings and 
mask firm performance. Schelleman and Knechel (2010) argue that it’s up to the auditors 
to distinguish accounting discretion from management opportunism. This decision 
requires additional work and therefore results in higher fees. Finally, abnormal accruals 
increase the likelihood of firm-level litigation risk (Boone et al. 2011). William (2001) 
finds auditor litigation risk is positively associated with abnormal accruals and the 
probability of litigation increases when report more income-increasing accruals. Thus, 
abnormal accruals increase auditors’ potential litigation risk and auditors may pass the 
cost of higher risk to their clients by charging higher fees. 
To sum up, auditors should be responsive to clients with higher level of accruals. 
Specifically, auditors may charge higher fees to clients with higher level of accruals by 
charging higher risk premium or conducting more audit hours (higher billing rates) to 
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such clients.18  Consequently, I expect that fees will increase when clients have increased 
level of accruals, resulting in my first hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (“H1”): Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between 
audit fees and magnitude of accruals. 
 
In addition to test the association between audit pricing and accruals, this study 
further investigate how different legal systems influence fees-accruals association across 
countries. The role of legal institutions on the fees-accruals association could be 
understood by looking at the impacts of a country’s legal system on a manager’s 
reporting incentives and an auditor’s assessment of risks.   
Managers may have a certain degree of discretion and flexibility in reporting their 
financial performance, which is allowed and encouraged by accrual-basis accounting. 
Managers may opportunistically use these flexibilities to manipulate earnings, or they 
may choose to communicate private value-relevant information to stakeholders. As a 
result, accruals may be reflective of two distinct types of reporting incentives: the 
earnings manipulation or accounting discretion with legitimate reasons. Accruals used for 
opportunistic reasons are more likely to be associated with higher inherent risk by 
auditors and thus higher audit fees than accruals used with legitimate reasons. This is 
because opportunistic accruals are less likely than informational accruals to be 
subsequently realized into cash flows. One way of capturing these two different types of 
                                                          
18 Lacking audit engagement cost data, I am hesitating to conclude that higher fees are due to 
more audit effort. 
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accruals is to investigate a manager’s incentives which influence the likelihood that 
accruals will be subsequently realized. 
In this study, I use country-level strength of legal institutions to capture 
managers’ different incentives on earnings management across countries. According to 
Legal Origins Theory discussed in Chapter II, legal origins and related legal institutions 
(i.e., investor protection) play an important role in influencing international differences in 
corporate earnings management. For example, Huang (2001) and Leuz (2003) both find 
that managers are more likely to behave opportunistically in an environment with weak 
investor protection. This is because incentives to mask firm performance through 
earnings management arise partially from the conflict of interests between firm insiders 
and outsiders. In essence, managers conceal their private control benefits and decrease 
the possibilities of outside intervention by manipulating the level and variability of 
reported earnings. Therefore, strong and well-enforced outsider rights can limit insiders’ 
acquisition of private control benefits, and consequently, mitigate insiders’ incentives to 
manage earnings because they have little to conceal from outsiders. 
Based on these arguments, I expect the positive association between audit fees 
and accruals association is further strengthened under weak investor protection 
environment. This is because weak investor protection regimes provide managers more 
incentives and possibilities to manipulate earnings opportunistically and to mask firm 
performance, which may increase an auditor’s assessment of audit risks. As a result, 
clients with large accruals from counties with weak legal regimes may be assigned with 
further magnified audit risk and therefore higher audit fees. This reasoning leads to my 
second hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2 (“H2”): Ceteris paribus, the positive association between audit fees 
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IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
With data from 13 countries all over the world, I investigate whether auditors take 
magnitude of accruals into account when make pricing decisions, and the role of a 
country’s legal regime in audit pricing. Specifically, I test whether audit fees are 
responsive to accruals, and how the fees-accruals association changes when legal regime 
shifts across countries. I use two alternative measures to proxy for accruals, such as total 
accruals and discretionary accruals. In addition, I adopt a set of country-level indexes to 
capture strength or strictness of legal regime in a country. 
 
4.1 Measurements of Earnings Management 
One goal of this study is to examine the relationship between audit fees and 
accruals. I use two alternative measures to proxy for accruals, that is, total accruals and 
discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are the most widely used proxy for 
earnings management in prior studies. Besides discretionary accruals, in the context of 
auditor pricing literatures, I include total accruals as well. I incorporate total accruals 
because the actual level of accruals is the main focus of audit work and adjustments in 
practice (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1993). In addition, auditors may be more concerned 
with total accruals rather than discretionary accruals when assessing risk on a specific 
engagement (Lys and Watts 1994).  
The most prevalent cross-sectional Jones 1991 model and most recently used 
modified Dechow-Dichev 2002 model are not practical for the calculation of abnormal 
accruals with international data. These models require an industry-year group which has 
at least 20 observations. The number of observations per industry/country/year could be 
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rather small with international data, and which might result in the Jones-type 
discretionary accruals perform unreliably for international data (e.g., Wysocki 2004). 
Following Francis and Wang (2008), I use a linear expectation model adapted from 
DeFond and Park (2001), which uses a firm’s own prior year accruals as the calculation 
benchmark and expected accruals are based on prior year ratio of current accruals to sales, 
and the prior year ratio of depreciation expense to PPE (property, plant and equipment). 
By using a firm as its own control to compute discretionary accruals, this model 
essentially controls for cross-country differences in accounting standards, which used to 
be a most common challenge in most previous international studies. Importantly, note in 
this model, accruals are assumed to have a constant linear relationship over time with 
sales and gross PPE that could be used to estimate current-period accruals for a specific 
level of sales and gross PPE. Thus, predicted accruals are computed as follows: 
 
 




Discretionary accruals are defined as the firm’s actual total accruals minus 
predicted accruals for year t. Therefore, I compute the discretionary accruals (referred to 
herein as “|DA|”) as follows: 
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4.2 Measurement of Legal Regime 
One primary goal of this dissertation is to understand the role of a nation’s legal 
regime in audit pricing. In particular, I investigate how the relationship between audit 
fees and accruals varies when legal regime shifts across countries. Stated another way, I 
specifically test how the country-level legal institutions impact the fees-accruals 
associations. I use three alternative measurements from prior cross-country studies to 
proxy for strength or strictness of legal environments. The use of multiple measurements 
of legal environment may lend greater reliability to the results for cross-country studies.19  
I adopt three measures of legal regime: LAW, ENF_PRO and CLUSTER. These 
proxies have been used in a series of recent studies (e.g., La Portal et al. 1998, 2006, 
Leuz et al. 2003, Choi and Wong 2007, Francis and Wong 2008, Choi et al. 2008). 
Detailed definitions of these measures and data resources are included in APPENDIX II. 
I include LAW to proxy for a country’s legal origin, which is classified into two 
general families, common law and code (or civil) law. La Porta et al. (2006) argue that 
legal origin of a country sets up the foundation of basic legal rights, and through which 
corporate law and securities law are developed. La Porta et al. (1998) find that countries 
with common law legal origin provide greater investor protection than countries with 
code law legal origin. Following Choi and Wong (2007), I include ENF_PRO to capture 
a country’s strength of anti-director rights and legal enforcement. The ENF_PRO is a 
combined index of ANTI_DIR (anti-director right index ) and LAW_ENF (law 
                                                          
19
 Francis and Wang (2008) point out that it’s common to use multiple measures of legal regimes in one 
study because: legal environment may include multiple dimensions and one measurement is not sufficient 
to capture different aspects; country-level metrics may have potential measurement errors, and thus 
consistent results found across measures may improve confidence to the results. 
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enforcement index), and equals the sum of 100% of the ANTI_DIR value and 50% of 
LAW_ENF value.20 
Leuz et al. (2003) identify investor protection as a key institutional factor 
affecting manager’s financial reporting incentives and thus as a significant determinant of 
earnings management activities around the world. In particular, they find firms in 
countries with developed markets, dispersed ownership structures, strong investor rights 
and legal enforcement tend to engage in less earnings management. Leuz et al. (2003) 
make a country cluster analysis and groups countries with similar legal institutional 
characteristics together. They identify three distinct country groups: (1) outsider 
economies with large capital markets, dispersed ownership, strong investor rights, and 
strong legal enforcement (e.g., UK and US); (2) insider economies with less-developed 
capital markets, concentrated ownership, weak investor rights, but strong legal 
enforcement (e.g., Sweden); and (3) insider economies with weak legal enforcement (e.g., 
Italy). Following Leuz et al. (2003), I include the CLUSTER to proxy for a country’s 
legal and institutional characteristic. CLUSTER equals one for firms from group 1 in 
Leuz et al. (2003), which represent economies with large equity markets, dispersed 
ownership, strong investor rights and legal enforcement. CLUSTER equals zero for firms 
from group 2 and 3 in Leuz et al. (2003). 21 
 
                                                          
20 La Porta el al. (1998) uses ANTI_DIR to measure how easily outside and minority stockholders can 
exercise their rights against opportunistic behavior by managers and controlling owners. LAW_ENF is an 
index of law enforcement equals the mean of (1) efficiency of judicial system; (2) rule of law and (3) 
corruption index. Higher values of this index indicate better legal enforcement. 
21 Leuz et al. (2003) document significant differences between group 1 and group 2&3. The 1st 
group is identified by large stock markets, low ownership concentration, extensive outsider rights, 
high disclosure, and strong legal enforcement. The 2nd and 3rd groups show markedly smaller 
stock markets, higher ownership concentration, weaker investor protection, lower disclosure 
levels, and weaker enforcement. 
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4.3 Empirical Model  
To test H1 to H2, I estimate the following regression model that links audit fees to 
my test variables, Accruals, Investor Protection and Accruals*Investor Protection, as 
well as other control variables, which are deemed to have influences on audit pricing. 




AFEE      = natural log of fees paid to auditors for financial statement audits in thousands  
                   of US dollars 
Accruals   = 2 alternative measures: Absolute Total accruals; Absolute Discretionary Accruals 
Investor Protection= 3 alternative measures: LAW; ENF_PRO and CLUSTER 
LNTA      = natural log of total assets in thousands of US dollars 
INVREC   = the sum of inventories and receivables divided by total assets 
INTAN     = intangible assets divided by total assets 
FOREIGN = 1 if firm pays any foreign income tax; 0, otherwise 
EXORD    = 1 if firm reports any extraordinary gains or losses; 0, otherwise 
LOSS        = 1 if firm reports a loss during the year; 0, otherwise 
LEVE       = the ration of year-end total liabilities to total assets 
ROA        = return on assets (income before extraordinary items divided by average total  
                    assets) 
B4         = 1 if firm uses one of the Big 4 (5, 6, or 8) auditors; 0, otherwise 
AUD_OPN =1 if firm receives a qualified opinion; 0, otherwise 
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BTM         = natural log of book-to-market ratio 
LITIGATE    = natural log of Wingate’s 1997 litigation index 
GDP          = GDP per capita per country per year 
 
To measure my test variable, Accruals, I use two distinct proxies: (1) absolute 
total accruals and (2) absolute discretionary accruals. Other than signed accruals, I use 
the absolute value of both accrual measures because interest of this study is to test the 
association between magnitude of accruals and audit pricing. Regardless of the direction 
of accruals, income increasing or income decreasing, auditors are expected to charge 
higher fees for large magnitude of accruals. I use these two proxies for Accruals when 
testing H1. As discussed earlier in Chapter III, I predict a positive coefficient for both 
these two proxies for Accruals. 
My hypothesis H2 is concerned with whether the positive relation, if any, between 
Accruals and AFEE are more pronounced for firms from countries with weaker legal 
regimes. To test H2, I include the interaction term Accruals*Investor Protection, where 
Investor Protection refers to the strength or strictness of legal institutions in a country. I 
use three distinct ways to proxy for Investor Protection: (1) LAW; (2) ENF_PRO and (3) 
CLUSTER. As discussed earlier in Chapter III, I predict a negative coefficient for the 
interaction term Accruals*Investor Protection. 
In Eq. (1), I include 13 other control variables: LNTA, INVREC, INTAN, 
FOREIGN, EXORD, LOSS, LEVE, ROA, BTM, B4, AUD_OPN, LITIGATE and GDP_PC. 
Following Simunic (1980), extant auditing literature shows that audit fees are a function 
of three client-specific factors: client size, client complexity, and client-specific risk. I 
include LNTA to capture client size. Audit fees are expected to be positively associated 
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with client size. To capture client complexity, I include INVREC, INTAN, FOREIGN and 
EXORD. Audit fees are expected to be higher for clients with more complex business 
activities and operations, and thus these variables are predicted to be positively associated 
with audit fees. To proxy for client-specific risk, I include LOSS, LEVE and ROA. 
Auditors charge higher fees for risky clients, and thus I predict a positive association with 
LOSS and LEVE, while a negative association with ROA. In addition, I include B4 to 
capture Big 4 auditor fee premium.  
As a control for country-level factors, following Choi et al. (2008), I include 
LITIGATE (refers to Wingate index 1997) to proxy for the extent of litigation risk 
auditors face in a specific economy. The Wingate Litigation Index (1997) is risk rating 
across countries developed by an international insurance underwriter for one of the Big 4 
accounting firms. The rating represents the “risk of doing business as an auditor” in a 
specific country and considers various national institutions, such as legal and regulatory 
environments, political and economic environments, and the professional accounting 
environment. The index varies substantially across countries and ranges from 3.61 to 15 
in my sample. In addition, the differences in audit fees may result from the different 
levels of consumption and pricing across countries. Thus, I include GDP_PC to control 
for cross-country differences in living and consumption standards. 
To further explore the sub-question to research question 1, which is the causality 
issue between audit fees and accruals, I run two additional tests. First, I partition the full 
sample into two sub-groups based on the sign of discretionary accruals: positive 
discretionary accruals sample (income increasing) and negative discretionary accruals 
sample (income decreasing). If the fees-accruals association is driven by lack of audit 
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independence, then firms with income increasing accruals may have greater incentives to 
“bribe” auditors compared to firms with income decreasing accruals. As a result, I should 
observe the following: (a) stronger association with the positive accrual sample and/or (b) 
little or insignificant association with the negative accruals sample. Second, I use a 2 
Stage Lease Square to control for the potential endogeneity between audit fees and 
accruals in robustness check. 
 
4.4 Sample and Data Collection 
My sample consists of all firms from 13 countries where data on audit fees, 
auditor identity and financial information are available from the 2006 Worldscope 
Database. 22  My sample period covers eleven years from 1996 to 2006. 23  Initially, I 
obtained a sample of 47,972 firm-year observations. After imposing the data requirement 
for calculating all the variables included in model 1 and 2, I obtained a sample of 23,398 
firm-year observations from these 13 countries, including the United States, United 
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, South Africa, 
Sweden, Singapore, Denmark, and Malaysia. I winsorized the data at both 1% and 99% 
level to reduce the effect of a few extreme values.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. Panel A shows that |DA| has a mean and 
median of 0.08 and 0.04 respectively. The mean Tobin’s Q is 1.57, which is parallel to 1.54 
for the sample of firms in Doidge et al. (2004).  Big 4 has a mean of 0.73, suggesting that 
73% of sample firms are Big 4’s clients. Panel B in Table 1 reports the number of 
                                                          
22
 To be comparable with prior research, such as Choi et al. (2008), the countries I selected are the same as 
their selections. 
23
 The US sample period mainly covers from 2002 to 2006, since the audit fee data for most US firms are 
not available before 2002. 
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observations per country and descriptive statistics for measures of country –level legal 
institutions: LITIGATE, LAW, ENF_PRO and CLUSTER. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for AFEE, UAF, ׀DA׀, and Tobin’s Q across 
countries. Mean audit fees fall between 3.58 (Malaysia) and 8.56 (United States). The mean 
unexpected audit fees fall between -0.335(Hong Kong) and 1.49 (South Africa).  And the 
mean ׀DA׀ fall between 0.04 (United States) and 0.10 (Hong Kong). Finally, the mean 
Tobin’s Q fall between 1.21 (Singapore) and 2.15 (United States). The mean and median 
statistics along with their standard deviations or range suggest that the variables are 
distributed with wide variation.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables included in 
Equation (2). My measure of absolute discretionary accruals |DA| is significant 
negatively correlated to UAF. 24  Most of the control variables in Equation (2) are 
significantly related to |DA|, implying the need to control for their effects in the 
multivariate analyses. For example, clients of Big 4 auditors, bigger firms, lowly levered 
firms, firms with high cash flows, firms with low growth rate, firms with low PPE 
changes, and firms without lagged loss are associated with a low level of absolute 
discretionary accruals. It is worth noting that firm size (LNTA) is significantly correlated 
with BIG4, LEVE, and CFO, with coefficients = 0.282, -0.012, and 0.019, respectively. 
This suggests that large firms are more likely to hire Big 4 auditors, to have lower 
leverage and to have bigger cash flows from operations compared with small firms. 
Overall, in Table 3, the correlation statistics imply that the results of multivariate 
                                                          
24
 This result is not surprising. The negative association may due to the asymmetric effects of UAF on 
accruals, and this result is driven by negative UAF (see later  multivariate results). 
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regressions are less likely to suffer from multicollinearity problems (If a correlation 
coefficient matrix with all independent variables indicates correlations of 0.75 or higher, 
then there may be a problem with multicollinearity). 
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V.  Main Results 
5.1 Audit Pricing and Accruals 
Main findings 
This section addresses the central issues of the study: First, what is the 
relationship between audit fees and accruals? Second, are legal institutions a determinant 
of the fees-accruals relationship? In other words, are audit fees responsive to various 
levels of accruals? And how does the responsiveness of audit pricing to accruals vary 
across different legal regimes? These issues are investigated, with Equation (1), by 
regressing total audit fees on proxies of accruals, measures of legal institutions and a set 
of control variables for other factors that may affect audit pricing. 
I estimate Equation (1) as a fixed effects model with year dummy variables to 
control for systematic time period effects. Industry dummies based on two-digit SIC 
codes, are included to control for omitted variables which may have potential effect on 
accruals. For brevity, year and industry dummies are not reported in tables. I estimate 
Equation (1) with country weighted least square (“WLS”) to control for the impacts of 
uneven samples across countries. For example, referring to panel B of Table 1, United 
Kingdom has 7,688 firm-year observations, while Italy has only 66 firm-year 
observations. The country weighted least squares, where the weight is inversely 
proportional to the number of observations per country, can handle regression situations 
in which the data points are of varying quality and thus ensure heavily represented 
countries of the sample do not drive the results (Wooldridge 2009). 
Table 4 presents the results of WLS regressions for Equation (1): I use absolute 
total accruals in panel A and absolute discretionary accruals in panel B, as alternative 
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measures of accruals. In columns 2 to 4 of both panel A and B, I use LAW, ENF_PRO 
and CLUSTER, respectively, as a proxy for country-level invertor rights protection 
strength. In both panel A and panel B, the coefficients of Accruals are highly significant 
(p-value< 0.00), with an expected positive sign across all eight cases. This result strongly 
supports H1, suggesting that the magnitude of absolute total accruals or absolute 
discretionary accruals are positively associated with audit fees. Stated another way, audit 
pricing is responsive to various levels of accruals. For example, auditors charge higher 
fees to firms with increased level of accruals. This result adds additional evidence to 
mixed findings of previous research examining the association between audit fees and 
accruals, by documenting a positive fees-accruals association (e.g., Frankel, Johnson and 
Nelson 2002; Kinney, Palmrose and Scholz 2004). 
In both panel A and panel B, I find the coefficients of LAW, ENF_PRO and 
CLUSTER are all highly significant (p-value <0.00), with a negative sign across all cases. 
This result suggest that, all else being equal, auditors tend to charge lower fees to clients 
from common law, stronger legal enforcement and investor protection countries. More 
importantly, I also find the coefficients of Accruals*LAW, Accruals*ENF_PRO, and 
Accruals*CLUSTER are highly significant (p<0.00), with an expected negative sign in all 
six cases. This is consistent with H2, implying that the fee premium associated with 
increased level of accruals is stronger for firms from countries with weak legal 
institutions, particularly for those from civil law countries or countries with weaker legal 
enforcement and investor protection rights. 
With respect to the estimated coefficients of the control variables, the following is 
obvious. Consistent with the literature, auditors charge higher fees for clients with bigger 
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size (LNTA), more complex operations (INVREC, INTAN, FOREIGN, EXORD) and 
greater inherent risk (ROA, BTM, LOSS). I find coefficients of these fee determinants are 
all highly significant (p<0.00) with expected signs across all regressions. In addition, I 
find the coefficient of LITIGATE is highly significant (p<0.00) with a positive sign across 
all cases, which is consistent with the finding of Choi, Kim, Liu and Simunic (2008) and 
supporting the view that country-specific litigation risk is a critical driver to determine 
the differences in levels of audit fees across countries. I also find the coefficient of 
GDP_PC is highly significant (p<0.00) and positive. This indicates that, all else being 
equal, auditors charge higher fees to firms from countries with higher living and 
consumption standards. I find the coefficient of B4 is highly significant (p<0.00) and 
positive, supporting the view that Big 4 auditors tend to charge fee premiums to clients 
compared to non-Big 4 auditors. Finally, I find the coefficient of AUD_OPN is highly 
significant (p<0.00) and positive. This suggests that, all else being equal, firms with 
qualified audit opinions tend to have higher audit fees. 
In Table 4, Panel C, I use absolute lag discretionary accruals as test variable and 
repeat the regressions in panel A and B. I find the coefficient of LagAccruals is highly 
significant (p<0.00) and positive through column 1, 2 and 4. I also find the coefficients of 
LagAccruals*LAW, LagAccruals*ENF_PRO, and LagAccruals*CLUSTER are highly 
significant (p<0.00), with an expected negative sign in column 2 and column 4. These 
results are consistent with both H1 and H2. More importantly, the findings that audit fees 
are positively associated with lag accruals lend additional support to the causality issue 
between audit fees and accruals. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
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Results in Table 4 document a positive association between audit fees and 
accruals. There exists two alternative ways to interpret the relationship: “risk pricing” 
reasoning and “economic bonding” theory. In the next stage of analysis, I run an 
additional test to disentangle these two arguments. I partition the sample into two sub-
groups based on the sign of accruals: positive discretionary accruals sample (income 
increasing) and negative discretionary accruals sample (income decreasing). If the fees-
accruals association is driven by lack of audit independence, then firms with income 
increasing accruals may have greater incentives to “bribe” auditors compared to firms 
with income decreasing accruals. In response, I should observe the following: (a) stronger 
association with the positive accrual sample, and/or (b) little or insignificant association 
with the negative accruals sample.  
I repeat the regressions in panel B of Table 4 with 2 separate sub-samples: 
positive accrual sub-sample vs. negative accrual sub-sample. Table 5 presents the results. 
I find the coefficient of Accruals is highly significant (p<0.00) and positive for both 
positive discretionary accrual sub-sample and negative discretionary accrual sub-sample. 
And the coefficient is not statistically smaller for the negative accrual sub-sample. These 
results suggest that audit fees are positively related to the magnitude of accruals 
regardless of whether it is income increasing or income decreasing. Stated another way, 
these results do not support the view that the positive fees-accruals association is caused 
by fee-induced economic bond. In addition to providing support for H1, these results can 
also be interpreted as lending additional support to “risk pricing” reasoning, which argues 
that auditors charge higher fees to conduct more audits or to compensate for greater risk 
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for clients with higher level of accruals. In other words, my findings do not support the 
view that independence in-fact is impaired by excessive audit fees. 
In addition, I find the coefficients of Accruals*LAW, Accruals*ENF_PRO, 
Accruals*CLUSTER are highly significant (p<0.00) and negative across all regressions. 
This suggests that auditors tend to charge greater fee premium for increased level of 
accruals if firms are from countries with weak legal institutions. These results not only 
support H2, but also lend additional support to the “risk pricing” argument. This is 
because, if the positive fees-accruals association is due to economic bond between 
auditor and client, then clients from counties with strong legal regimes need to pay higher 
additional fees to “bribe” auditors since auditors have higher possibilities to be caught 
and once being caught the penalties will be much higher under such legal environments. 
If this is the case, a positive coefficient of the interaction term Accruals*LAW (or 
Accruals*ENF_PRO, Accruals*CLUSTER) should be observed.  
 [INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
5.2 Robustness Checks and Additional Tests 
5.2.1 Impacts of Big 4 Auditors 
The link between the Big 4 auditors and fees-accruals association can be 
understood by looking at two streams of research. The first steam of research examines 
the fee spread between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors, and finds significant differences 
between them (Francis and Taylor 1995, DeFond et al. 2000). For example, in their 
international study, Choi et al. (2008) investigate the cross-sectional determinants of 
audit fees and document existence of significant Big 4 fee premium (the fee spread 
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between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors) across countries. In addition, they find that the 
Big 4 fee premium varies when legal regime shift from one to another. In the second 
stream, extant literature tests the association between audit size and earnings quality, and 
find that Big 4 auditors tend to have greater constraining impacts on magnitude of 
accruals than non-Big 4 auditors (e.g., Becker et al. 1998, Choi et al. 2003). 
Based on these arguments and previous findings, I thus predict following two 
conjunctures: (1) the fee premiums charged to accruals tend to be larger for Big 4 clients, 
and (2) the Big 4 fee premiums charged to accruals tend to be further magnified for firms 
from countries with weak legal regimes. These are because Big 4 auditors act more 
conservative to magnitude of accruals and Big 4 may be more sensitive to possibilities of 
earnings manipulation under weak legal environment, where managers have greater 
incentives to use accounting discretion opportunistically. And thus Big 4 may charge an 
even greater fee premium to accruals under weak legal regimes. 
Table 6 presents the results of test concerning the impacts of Big 4 auditors on the 
fees-accruals association. I repeat the main regressions in Eq. (1) by adding a few 
interaction variables. Two two-way interaction variables, Accruals * B4 and Investor 
Protection* B4, and one three-way interaction variable, Accruals* Investor 
Protection*B4, are included. In column 3, I find the coefficient of Accruals*B4 is highly 
significant (p-value <0.00) with an expected positive sign. This result is consistent with 
my first conjuncture, suggesting that Big 4 auditors charge a greater fee premium to firms 
with high accrual levels than non-Big 4 auditors do. I also find the coefficient of Investor 
Protection*B4 is highly significant (p-value <0.00) with an expected positive sign. This 
 - 70 - 
 
implies that when making pricing decisions, Big 4 auditors take the country-level legal 
regimes into their considerations. 
More interestingly, the coefficient of the three way interaction term Accruals* 
Investor Protection*B4 is highly significant (p-value <0.00) with an expected negative 
sign. This finding indicates that Big 4 auditors charge greater fee premium to firms with 
higher accruals, and this premium is even bigger for firms from countries with low 
strength of investor protections. 
 
5.2.2 Alternative Measure of Audit Fees 
As a further robustness check, I re-examine the fees-accruals association by using 
an alternative audit fee metric, the unexpected audit fees (UAF). I adopt this fee metric 
because of following reasons. Firstly, prior studies testing the association between total 
audit fees (or non-audit fees) and financial reporting quality provide insignificant or at 
best mixed results, implying that the total audit fees (or non-audit fees)  may not act as a 
good proxy. Secondly, UAF may be able to capture the idiosyncratic relationship 
between auditor and client without the influence of client’s innate firm characteristics, 
such as size, complexity, risk etc. For example, Kinney and Libby (2002) claim that 
“unexpected non-audit fees and audit fees may more accurately be likened by attempted 
bribes” and “unexpected fees may also better capture the profitability of the services 
provided.” Finally, with respect to research methodology, this research is an international 
study. However, the non-audit fee data are not publicly available for most countries. As a 
result, the use of non-audit fee as fee measure is not applicable in cross-country studies. 
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To measure UAF, I partition the audit fees into two parts, namely, the expected 
(or normal) audit fees and the unexpected (or abnormal) audit fees. By isolating expected 
audit fees from total audit fees, UAF are the residuals exclude the known resources 
needed to conduct an audit. I use an expectation model with various determinants of audit 
fees from prior studies (Simunic 1980, Frankel, Johnson and Nelson 2002, Choi, Kim and 
Zang 2005, Choi et al. 2008, Hope et al. 2008), such as client size, complexity of client’s 
operations, and liquidity or solvency of client. I also control for country-level factors and 
include the Wingate index (see Choi et al. 2008) to measure the litigation risk auditors 
face in a specific country. Building on the results of prior studies on audit fee 
determinants, I estimate the following model and use the error term as measure of UAF: 
 
 
Therefore, in the first stage, I calculate UAF as residuals from the above equation. 
Specifically, I compute the fitted values of AFEE with estimated coefficients in this 
equation, and UAF is the difference between AFEE and predicted value of AFEE.  
In the second stage of my analysis, I estimate the following regression model that 
links absolute discretionary accruals to UAF as well as other control variables. 
Specifically, I estimate the following regression: 
 
  
where the dependent variable, |DA|, is absolute discretionary accruals for each firm in 
each year. 
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The accrual model is derived from prior studies such as Francis and Wang (2008), 
Choi et al. (2010), to name just a few. Following these studies, I control for variables 
which might have an influence on the magnitude of discretionary accruals. GROWTH 
represents the growth in sales relative to prior year sales, and ΔPPE measures growth in 
gross PPE over the prior year. LAG_LOSS is a dummy variable to represent firms with 
prior year losses. LAG_ACCR represents one-year lagged total accruals. Other variables 
are defined earlier. 
Prior research finds that large firms tend to report lower levels of discretionary 
accruals than small firms. I include LNTA to control for the size effect. I control for CFO 
(deflated by lagged total assets) due to the well-documented inverse association between 
the operating cash flow and accruals. Firms with high leverage ratios have greater 
incentive to increase earnings for debt covenant concerns, and therefore I include LEV. I 
include two variables to control for firm growth, namely GROWTH and ΔPPE, which 
could also affect yearly accruals. A firm with financial distress and bankruptcy risk has 
more incentive to boost earnings in the following year, and thus including LOSS_1 can 
control this effect. In addition, I include BIG4, since previous studies indicate that Big 4 
auditors are effective in constraining managers’ earnings manipulation behavior. I 
include AUD_OPN due to prior studies show that firms with higher magnitude of 
discretionary accruals are more likely to have qualified audit opinions. 
Column 1 of Table 7 reports the results of WLS regression for Eq. (2) for the full 
sample. The coefficient of UAF (p-value <0.00) is highly significant and with a positive 
sign. This result lends additional support to H1, suggesting that UAF is positively 
associated with magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals.  
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There is an asymmetric issue of UAF, which is largely ignored by much of the 
prior research. As noted by Choi et al. (2010), the association between abnormal audit 
fees and absolute discretionary accruals is asymmetric, depending on the sign of 
abnormal audit fees. Positive abnormal audit fees may create incentives for auditors to 
compromise audit independence for greater profits. However, negative or zero abnormal 
audit fees (which represents specific client may not bring bigger profit to auditor) may 
not be able to generate similar motivations to auditors. As a result, when positive UAF 
and negative UAF are pooled, the two opposing effects may offset each other and result 
in insignificant association with accruals.25 Prior studies fail to find any significant results 
may because of their negligence of this asymmetric effect. 
In addition, taking the asymmetric effect of UAF into account, I further partition 
the full sample into two sub-groups: sample with positive UAF vs. sample with negative 
UAF. Column 2 and 3 of Table 7 report the results of WLS regressions of Eq. (2) for the 
two sub-samples respectively. In column 2, the positive UAF subsample, the coefficient 
of UAF is highly significant (p-value <0.00) and positive, while in column 3, the negative 
UAF subsample, the coefficient of UAF is not statistically significant (p-value > 0.14). 
These results are consistent with the finding of Choi et al. (2010): they document a 
significant positive association between positive abnormal audit fees and discretionary 
accruals; while they fail to find any significant association between the two when 
abnormal audit fees are negative.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
                                                          
25
 Theoretically, positive abnormal audit fees can be viewed as so called “client-specific quasi-rents”, and 
the quasi-rents creates incentives for auditors to compromise independence (DeAngelo 1981). With respect 
to negative abnormal audit fees, the situations are more complex. According to Choi et al. (2010), three 
possibilities may be expected for the association between negative abnormal audit fees and magnitude of 
accruals: insignificant, positive and negative. 
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Next, to further explore the causality of the significant association between 
excessive audit fees (positive UAF) and discretionary accruals, I run an additional test 
and partition the sample into two sub-groups based on the sign of accruals: positive 
discretionary accruals sample (income increasing) and negative discretionary accruals 
sample (income decreasing). If the fees-accruals association is driven by lack of audit 
independence, then firms with income increasing accruals may have greater incentives to 
“bribe” auditors compared to firms with income decreasing accruals. In response, I 
should observe the following: (a) stronger association with the positive accrual sample, 
and/or (b) little or insignificant association with the negative accruals sample.  
Table 8 represents the results of WLS regressions of Eq. (2) for the positive UAF 
sample only. I further separate the sample into two sub-groups: positive DA subsample 
(column 1) and negative |DA| subsample (column 2). The coefficient of UAF is highly 
significant (p<0.00) and positive for both positive DA sub-sample and negative DA sub-
sample. And the coefficient is not statistically smaller for the negative accrual sub-sample. 
These results suggest that positive UAF is positively related to |DA| regardless of whether 
it is income increasing or income decreasing. In other words, these results do not support 
the view that the positive fees-accruals association is caused by fee-induced economic 
bond.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
Taken together, findings in Table 7 and Table 8 lend additional support to H1, 
suggesting that UAF is positively associated with absolute discretionary accruals, 
especially when UAF is positive. And the positive association between excessive audit 
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fees and accruals are more likely driven by the “risk pricing” reasoning other than 
impaired audit independence.  
 
5.2.3 Alternative Measures of Legal Regime 
Given the importance of the Investor Protection measure in my tests, I discuss 
results with multiple legal regime measures. I repeat the main regression by replacing 
Investor Protection with three other legal origin and legal institution measures 
respectively, which are LIT_STD, PUB_ENF and SEC_REG (description of variables 
and data resources are described in APPENDIX). In order to measure the strength of 
securities laws, I include LIT_STD and PUB_ENF. LIT_STD is a liability index to 
measure investor’s liability standard to recover losses from issuers of securities, auditors 
and other related parties when there has existed information distortion in the securities 
issuance. Liability standard captures the easiness of investors to sue auditors. According 
to La Porta et al. (2006), PUB_ENF is the index to measure public enforcement of 
security laws and is based on characteristics of regulatory agency, noncriminal sanctions, 
criminal sanctions etc. PUB_ENF captures to what extent auditors can be penalized for 
audit failure. Jaggi and Low (2009) find that not only can investor protection impact audit 
fees, but also securities regulation, particularly in countries with low investor protection. 
I include the measure SEC_REG to proxy for a country’s overall effectiveness of 
securities regulation.  
For brevity reasons, untabulated results show that my inferences for H1 and H2 
are unaltered. Audit fees continue to be significantly and positively associated with 
caarucca. In all regressions, coefficient of the interaction term between legal institutional 
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measures and accruals are significant with an expected positive sign. These finding 
support that legal origins and related legal institutions are determinant of fees-accruals 
association and the measurements of legal regime do not drive the results. 
 
5.2.4 Potential Endogeneity Between |DA| and Audit Fees 
As discussed above, the causality between audit fees and accruals can go both 
ways: accrual choices may be determined by fees paid to auditors and audit fees may be 
influenced by a client's accrual level. I use a 2 SLS to control for the potential 
endogeneity between |DA| and audit fees as following: 
Audit fee = α + β |DA| + θ N+ ε 
|DA| = λ+ φ Audit fee + η R+ μ 
Endogenous variables:  |DA|, audit fee 
Exogenous variables: R, N (R and N are all control variables in Equation (1) & 
(2)) 
Step 1: Regress endogenous variables against all exogenous variables. 
Audit fee = a + b N + c R +e 
|DA| = d+ f N + g R + u 
Get  and  
Step 2: Regress original regressions, replacing endogenous variables with predicted 
values  and . 
Audit fee = α + β  + θ N+ ε 
|DA| = λ+ φ  + η R+ μ 
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Panel A and panel B of Table 9 report the results of 2 SLS as discussed above. In 
the first-stage regressions, presented in column 1 of panel A and B, the dependent 
variables |DA| and AFEE are regressed on all exogenous independent variables in both 
models. The predicted (fitted) value of the dependent variable from this regression is used 
as the test variable ( ) in the second-stage regressions, presented in column 2 
of panel A and B. 
In Table 9, Panel A, Column 2 presents the second-stage regression results for the 
audit fees model. I find the results of the second-stage regressions with the instrumental 
variable  are qualitatively identical with the results presented in Table 4. 
Specifically, the coefficients of   are highly significant (p-value< 0.00), with an 
expected positive sign, consistent with H1. These results show that the results for the 
second-stage do not change after controlling for this potential endogeneity. This result 
implies that my findings are not confounded by potential endogeneity problem between 
|DA| and audit fees. 
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VI. Additional Results 
6.1 Unexpected Audit Fees and Firm Value 
Auditors, on the one hand, provide independent assurance services to clients and, 
on the other hand, are hired and compensated by their clients. Such an auditor-client 
relationship creates an inborn independence problem to auditors. In practice, audit 
independence has been perceived as threatened by economic dependence of audit fees on 
clients. For example, SEC 2000 stated its concern that additional fees obtained by 
auditors through excessive high audit fees and provision of non-audit service may further 
increase the auditor-client economic bond and erode audit independence (both in-fact and 
in-appearance).  
In the context of financial reporting quality (accruals quality), in Sections 5.1 and 
5.2, I use magnitude of accruals to proxy for audit independence in-fact and test its 
association with audit fees. I find a positive association between audit fees and accruals, 
and this association is more inclined due to “risk pricing” reasoning other than “economic 
bonding” argument. In other words, contrary to the common belief, my results do not 
suggest that excessive audit fees reduce audit independence in-fact. 
In this section, I extend the previous analysis by examining whether audit 
independence in-appearance is impaired by high audit fees. Stated another way, do 
investors view high audit fees as reduced audit independence and lower audit quality? 
Examining the economic consequences of audit fees in the context of firm valuation, I 
use Tobin’s Q to proxy for investor’s perception on audit independence (or audit 
independence in-appearance). 
 - 79 - 
 
The association between audit fees and firm value can be understood by 
considering the role of auditing and its impact on “information risk.” Francis et al. (2005) 
define information risk as “the likelihood that firm-specific information that is pertinent 
to investor pricing decisions is of poor quality.” By upholding their objectivity and 
independence, auditors can lend additional credibility to client’s financial reporting. In 
his speech in 2000, the former chairman of SEC, Arthur Levitt argued that, without 
confidence in an auditor’s objectivity and fairness, investors can hardly be expected to 
trust a company’s financial reporting. An audit of high independence can lend credibility 
to accounting information, reduce the noises of information for investor’s decision 
making, and thus reduce information risk, which in turn reduces the cost of capital (Barry 
and Brown, 1985) and improves firm market value. However, if investors perceive audit 
as with lacking audit independence, credibility of accounting information will decrease 
and information risk will increase, which as a response increases the cost of capital and 
impairs market valuation. 
Taken together, if investors perceive high level of audit fees as more economic 
bond between auditor and client, greater possibilities for auditors to succumb to client 
pressure (Nelson et al. 2002) and thus impaired audit independence, then credibility of 
financial reporting will decrease, information risk will increase and firm valuation will be 
discounted. I therefore predict a negative association between audit fees and firm 
valuation.  
To test my conjuncture, I estimate the following regression model that links 
Tobin’s Q to my test variable UAF along with interaction variable UAF*Investor 
Protection, as well as other control variables. In this test, I use UAF as the fee metric 
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because this measure is determined by specific contractual relationship between auditor 
and client (Hribar et al. 2010; Choi et al. 2010) and can better surrogate for the potential 
economic bond if there exists. Specifically, the model takes the following form: 
 
where the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q for each firm in each year.  As previous 
research (e.g., Pae et al. 2008), I compute Tobin’s Q as the ratio of total assets plus the 
market value of common stock less the book value of equity to the book value of assets. 
Table 9 presents the results of weighted least square regressions for Eq. (3): In 
panel A, I use UAF as the fee metric. In columns 1 to 3, I use LAW, ENF_PRO and 
CLUSTER, respectively as a proxy for Investor Protection. In panel B, I repeat the 
regressions in panel A with an alternative fee metric: AFEE. In both panel A and panel B, 
the coefficients of UAF (AFEE) are highly significant (p-value <0.00) and positive across 
all six cases. This result is contradictory to my above prediction, suggesting that firms 
with higher level of audit fees actually enjoy higher firm valuation. In other words, 
investors attach a positive value to firms with higher audit fees. My findings do not 
support the common belief which argues that high audit fees are perceived as lower audit 
independence. 
In addition, I find the coefficients of LAW, ENF_PRO and CLUSTER are all 
highly significant (p-value <0.00), with a positive sign across all regressions. This is 
consistent with findings in prior literatures that the market tend to attach higher valuation 
multiples to firms from countries with common law or with strong legal enforcement and 
investor protection (Doidge et al. 2007). More interestingly, I also find that the 
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coefficients of UAF*LAW, UAF*ENF_PRO, AFEE*LAW, AFEE*ENF_PRO, 
AFEE*CLUSTER are all highly significant (p-value <0.00) with a negative sign across 
all regressions. The finding suggests that the valuation premium associated with audit 
fees is stronger for firms from countries with weak legal institutions. This result also 
support the view that firm-level governance mechanisms, such as audit with high quality, 
and country-level governance mechanism, such as rule of law or investor protection 
strength, play a substitutive role (other than a complementary role) in firm valuation. 
In panel C, I repeat the regression in panel A with two additional control variables, 
|DA| and |DA|*UAF. I find the results in panel C are qualitatively identical with the 
results presented in panel A. Specifically, the coefficients of UAF are highly significant 
(p-value <0.00), with an expected positive value. The coefficients of UAF*LAW, 
UAF*ENF_PRO and UAF*CLUSTER are all highly significant (p-value <0.00), with a 
negative sign. In addition, I find the coefficient of |DA| are highly significant (p-value 
<0.00) and positive across 3 regressions. This finding suggests that managers may 
convey valuable information to investors through their accrual choices, and thus these 
accruals are positively priced by the market. 
With respect to the estimated coefficients of other control variables, the following 
is obvious. I find the coefficient of LNTA is highly significant (p-value < 0.00), with an 
expected negative sign across all six regressions. This is consistent with the finding in 
previous research (for e.g., Durnev and Kim 2005) that market assigns a lower value to 
larger firms, which is due to larger firms tend to have more agency problems. I find the 
coefficient of PROFIT is highly significant (p-value < 0.00) and positive across all six 
regressions. This suggests that market attaches a higher value to more profitable firms.  
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[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
 
6.2 Alternative Explanations: Are Investors Misled? 
The evidence in Section 6.1 suggests that high level of audit fees are priced 
positively by the market. In the context of firm valuation, examining the economic 
consequence of UAF is a joint test of market pricing mechanism and the nature of UAF. 
This suggests that finding of market attaches higher value to firms with higher audit fees 
can be interpreted with two scenarios. In the first scenario, investors are misled and the 
finding of pricing of UAF is the evidence of market mispricing. In the second scenario, 
investors attach a positive value to UAF because UAF captures value relevant 
information and helps to predict future performance. This is because auditors tend to 
charge larger audit fees for firms with higher level of accruals (refer to the finding in 
Section 5.1). The level of accruals may represent managers’ incentive to use accounting 
information for legitimate reasons, which is to convey their private information about 
future profitability to investors. As such, UAF may therefore capture managers’ incentive 
to communicate proprietary information. 
The analysis in this section aims to distinguish between the above-mentioned two 
alternative explanations by examining whether UAF help to predict future profitability or 
not. I develop the model by regressing CFO of next year on UAF and a number of control 
variables. Specifically, the model takes the following form: 
 
Table 10 presents the results of weighted least square regressions for Eq. (4): I use 
UAF as the fee metric. In columns 1 to 3, I use LAW, ENF_PRO and CLUSTER, 
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respectively as a proxy for Investor Protection. The coefficients of UAF are highly 
significant (p-value <0.00) and positive across all regressions. This result supports the 
conjuncture in the second scenario, suggesting that UAF is associated with a firm’s future 
CFO.  
In addition, I also find the coefficients of UAF*LAW, UAF*ENF_PRO and 
UAF*CLUSTER are all highly significant (p-value <0.00) with a negative sign across all 
regressions. This finding suggest that the ability of UAF to predict future CFO is more 
pronounced for firms from countries with civil law or weak legal enforcement and 
investor protections.  
 [INSERT TABLE 11 HERE] 
The findings documented in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, taken as a whole, suggest that 
investors attach positive value to excessive audit fees, because UAF is value relevant and 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Do auditors price accruals? What is the underlying causality to explain the 
association between fees and accruals? What is the role of legal institutions on the 
association between audit fees and accruals? This dissertation aims to shed light on these 
questions.  
In this dissertation, first of all, I find that audit fees are significantly and positively 
associated with accruals across countries. This result is consistent with a variety of prior 
studies (such as Frankel et al. 2002 and Choi et al. 2010), and most of these studies are 
used to employ “economic bonding” theory to explain the causality between audit fees 
and accruals. According to economic bonding argument, auditor independence is 
impaired through great economic dependence on client. Specifically, to retain clients with 
high audit fees, auditors may not be objective, not be able to retain professional 
skepticism, and not be diligent when conduct an audit. In addition, auditors may be more 
likely to acquiesce to clients’ pressure and allow their earnings management behavior. 
This provides one explanation of why high audit fees are observed to be positively related 
with higher level of accruals.  
I propose an alternative explanation for this positive fees-accruals association as 
following. Among other earning’s components, accruals are hard to observe and audit. 
For example, Francis and Krishnan (2003) point out that accruals include a manager’s 
subjective estimate of future outcomes, which cannot be verified until they occur. Thus, 
auditors face significant risks of litigation claims and associated reputation loss when 
clients have high level of discretionary accruals. If clients present higher level of 
discretionary accruals, auditors may charge a higher risk premium to compensate for 
additional risk they face. Auditors may also choose to conduct more hours of audit and 
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thus result in higher audit fees to lower their potential risk to acceptable level. Taken 
together, the large audit fees may represent auditors’ assessment of accrual level with 
their proprietary information on clients. My analysis shows that the fees-accruals 
association is more likely to be driven by the “risk pricing” argument, which argues that 
auditors charge higher fees to compensate for additional engagement risks reflected in 
higher accruals. 
Secondly, I find that a country’s legal regime plays a significant role in audit 
pricing and the fees-accruals association varies when legal regime shifts from one 
country to another. Specifically, the positive fees-accruals association is more 
pronounced for firms from weak legal environments. This finding is consistent with the 
“risk pricing” argument as well. This is because, if the positive fees-accruals association 
is due to economic bond between auditor and client, clients from counties with strong 
legal regimes need to pay higher additional fees to “bribe” auditors since auditors have 
higher possibilities to be caught and endure penalties much higher under such legal 
environments. If this is the case, the positive fees-accruals association should be further 
strengthened under strong legal environments other than from weak legal regimes. 
In the next stage of analysis, I proceed to investigate the impact of large audit fees 
on investors’ perceived audit independence. I find a significant positive association 
between audit fees and Tobin’s Q, and this association is more profound under weak 
legal environment than under strong legal environment. These results imply that investors 
did price large audit fees, and contrary to the common belief, they did not view excessive 
audit fees as a threat to audit independence. Instead, investors perceive large audit fees 
charged by auditors as conveying more valuable information to the market, and that 
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information is more important to investors in weak legal regime. This result also support 
the view that firm-level governance mechanisms, such as audit with high quality, and 
country-level governance mechanism, such as rule of law or investor protection strength, 
play a substitutive role (other than a complementary role) in firm valuation. 
To rule out the possibility that the pricing of large audit fees by the stock market 
due to investors being misled by an inefficient market, I further test whether excessive 
audit fees help to predict future profitability or not. I find excessive audit fees are 
significantly and positively associated with CFO of next year. These results show that 
excessive audit fees are priced by market because of audit fees help to predict future 
profitability and contain valuable information to investors. Further, these findings suggest 
that when managers have incentives to use their earnings discretion to convey private 
information to investors, they are willing to pay the additional cost (excessive audit fees).    
My findings are consistent with Subramanyam (1996)’s results and arguments. In 
his paper, Subramanyam (1996) find discretionary accruals are priced by the market and 
help predict future performance. Subramanyam (1996) states that “…while opportunistic 
accrual manipulation undoubtedly occurs in specific instances, it is less certain that it 
occurs on average in the population.” He argues that managers use their discretion to 
improve earnings ability to reflect fundamental value other than manipulate earnings 
opportunistically. 
 The findings in this dissertation have implications for both accounting research 
and practice. First, results reported in this study are inconsistent with several 
longstanding views on audit fees and audit independence. (1) Large audit fees are 
previously perceived to erode audit independence through the economic bonding between 
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auditor and client. I find no evidence of large audit fees causing a decrease of earnings 
quality. Instead, I document that excessive audit fees are resulted from an auditor’s risk 
pricing on higher level of discretionary accruals rather than the impaired independence. 
Although corruption between auditor and client via abnormally high audit fees certainly 
occurs in specific instances, it is less certain that it occurs on average in the population. (2) 
Large audit fees are not perceived as impaired audit independence and have been 
attached with market value. Additionally, the fact that excessive audit fees is priced by 
the market is because that excessive audit fees can improve value relevance of reported 
earnings and help predict future profitability.  
Second, the evidence that the fees-accruals association varies across countries 
suggest that legal institutions play critical roles on accrual choices and audit pricing. To 
the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to test the fees-accruals association across 
countries. Prior studies typically use single country sample only and most of the countries 
are from strong legal regimes. My data from 13 countries around the world allow the 
litigation systems vary from weak (such as Malaysia) to strong (such as the US), and thus 
provide better opportunity to observe the auditor-client relationship under different 
strength of legal systems. In addition, results of this study show that legal institution is a 
key factor to understand the manager’s reporting incentives and accrual choices, an 
auditor’s assessment of risk and audit pricing. 
Third, findings of this study may be interesting to government policy makers and 
standard setters. Contrary to their concern that excessive audit fees may erode audit 
quality, I document little evidence that large abnormal audit fees cause a decline in 
earnings quality. Thus, the effectiveness of SOX 2002 to improve audit independence and 
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thus audit quality by restricting auditors on consulting services (and other non-audit 
services) needs further investigation. Further, my results may be especially useful to 
IASB and IAASB. During the process of harmonizing accounting and auditing standards 
across countries around the world, it is especially important to consider impacts of local 
legal systems, practice and enforcement on accounting and auditing practices. 
My findings should be interpreted cautiously. First, although I use a set of 
measures of legal environments from different dimensions, these country-level proxies 
may still have measurement errors and proxy for some unknown country factors, which is 
common in international studies. Second, although I control for a number of country-
level factors (such as GDP, litigation risk), there may still exist other omitting country-
level factors that have impact on the fees-accruals relation. Finally, my sample size is 
greatly constrained by the availability of auditor fees. 
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Appendix I: Legal Institution Variables Definition and 
Data Sources 
Variable Definition Data source 
AFEE Natural log of fees paid to auditors for financial 
statement audits in thousands of US dollars 
 
Worldscope 
UAF Unexpected audit fees, the difference between 
AFEE and predicted value of AFEE. 
 
Worldscope 
ACCRUALS Accruals are measured by one of the two proxies 




Tobin’s Q Firm-year Tobin’s Q, the ratio of total assets 
plus the market value of common stock less 




LNTA Natural log of total assets in thousands of US 
dollars 
Worldscope 
PROFIT Operating income divided by total assets Worldscope 
INVREC The sum of inventories and receivables divided by 
total assets.  
 
Worldscope 
INTAN Intangible assets divided by total assets  
 
Worldscope 









LOSS 1 if firm reports a loss during the year; 0, otherwise 
 
Worldscope 
LOSS_1 1 if firm repots a loss from prior year; 0, otherwise 
 
 
LEVE The ratio of year-end total liabilities to total assets 
 
Worldscope 
ROA Return on assets (income before extraordinary 
items divided by average total assets) 
 
Worldscope 
BTM Natural log of book-to-market ratio 
 
Worldscope 




CFO_N CFO from following year divided by total assets 
 
 
GROWTH Growth in sales relative to prior year sales 
 
Worldscope 
ΔPPE Growth in gross PPE over the prior year 
 
Worldscope 




AUD_OPN 1 if firm receives a qualified opinion; 0, otherwise Worldscope 
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GDP_PC GDP per capita per country per year 
 
www.worldbank.org 
EQUITY Importance of a country’s equity market, measured 
by the extent to which each country’s firms rely on 
equity financing  
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Appendix II: Variables Definition and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Data source 
LAW Dummy variable, equals to 1 for a common-law 
country; 0, for a code-law country. 
 
La Porta et al. (2006) 
LITIGATE Natural log of the Wingate (1997) litigation index. 
This index is derived from an assessment of 
litigiousness for doing business as an auditor in each 
country and was developed by an international 
insurance underwriter for one of the Big 4 auditors. 
The index ranges from 1 to 15, with higher values 
indicate more litigation risk. 
 
Wingate (1997) 
ENF_PRO A combined index of ANTI_DIR and LAW_ENF, 
equals the sum of 100% of the ANTI_DIR value and 
50% of LAW_ENF value. 
 
Choi and Wong 
(2007) 
CLUSTER Dummy variable, equals to 1 for firms from 
group 1 in Leuz et al. (2003), which represent 
economies with large equity markets, dispersed 
ownership, strong investor rights and legal 
enforcement. CLUSTER equals to 0 for firms 
from group 2 and 3 in Leuz et al. (2003). 
 
Leuz et al. (2003) 
LIT_STD An index of liability standard, equals the mean of 1) 
liability standard for the issuer and directors; 2) 
liability standard for distributors; and 3) liability 
standard for accountants. This index ranges from 0 
to 1; with higher values indicate less procedural 
difficulty in recovering losses from agents. 
 
La Porta et al. (2006) 
PUB_ENF An index of public enforcement, equals the mean of 
1) supervisor characteristic index; 2) rule-making 
power index; 3) investigative power index; 4) orders 
index; 5) criminal index. This index ranges from 0 
to 1; with higher values indicate better public 
enforcement. 
 
La Porta et al. (2006) 
LAW_ENF An index of law enforcement equals the mean of 1) 
efficiency of judicial system; 2) rule of law; 3) 
corruption index. This index ranges from 0 to 10; 
with higher values indicate better legal enforcement. 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
SEC_REG 
 
A combined index for securities regulations, equals 
the arithmetic mean of disclosure requirements 
index, liability standards index (LIT_STD), and 
public enforcement index (PUB_ENF). 
La Porta et al. (2006) 
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Measured by AFEE and UAF 
 
Measured by Accruals 
Measure by a set of legal variables 
Firm Value 
Measured by Tobin’s Q 
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Auditors perceive high level of 
accruals 
High engagement risk 
Charge higher fee premiums to 
compensate for additional risk 
Use more hours and audit effort 
to decrease potential risk 
High audit fees 
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Tables  1~11 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables 
 
Variables                      Mean             Quartile1           Median          Quartile3            Std. Dev.
 
|DA|                                 0.08                   0.02                 0.04                  0.09                    0.114   
Tobin’s Q                        1.57                   0.84                 1.11                  1.69                    1.521 
AFEE                               5.36                 4.14                  5.16                  6.36                    1.817 
UAF                                  0.00                -0.60               -0.011                0.579                   0.999 
LITIGATE                       8.22                 4.82                    10                     10                      3.031 
B4                                     0.73                 0.00                   1                        1                        0.445 
LNTA                              12.83                11.16                 12.78               14.45                  2.480 
INVREC                          0.29                  0.09                   0.26                0.44                    0.224 
INTAN                             0.08                 0.00                    0.01                0.09                    0.159 
FOREIGN                       0.24                 0                         0                      0                        0.428 
EXORD                           0.08                 0                          0                      0                        0.266 
LEVE                               0.56                 0.32                     0.50                0.66                   0.293 
ROA                                1.53                -0.11                    4.29                 8.89                    16.83 
CFO                               4.18E5            155.75                 1.22E4             9.84E4                9.765E6 
BTM                               0.118               0.0358                 0.0719             0.135                   0.278 
GROWTH                       0.25                 -0.08                    0.06                  0.23                   1.199 
∆PPE                            -5.10E4             -0.20                    0.17                 1.42E4               1.587E7 
LOSS                              0.28                  0                         0                         1                       0.449 
LOSS_1                          0.27                  0                         0                         1                      0.444 
 
(Table 1   continued on next page) 
 




Panel B: Measures of Litigation Regime and Number of Observations per Country
 
Country                          N                 LITIGATE                 LAW               ENF_PRO              CLUSTER               
Australia                      2,923                     10                             1                           9                                1 
Denmark                       690                     4.82                            0                           7                                0                     
Hong Kong                  3,300                     10                             1                         9.11                             1     
Ireland                          327                      6.22                           1                          7.9                              0          
Italy                               66                        6.22                           0                          5.2                              0                             
Malaysia                      3,535                    3.61                           1                         7.39                              1 
New Zealand                305                       10                             1                           9                                 0 
Norway                         534                      6.22                           0                           9                                 1 
Singapore                     1,975                   4.82                           1                         8.29                              1                      
South Africa                  773                     4.82                           1                         7.21                              0                         
Sweden                          690                      4.82                           0                           8                                0                            
United Kingdom           7,688                     10                            1                         9.29                              1                  
United States                1,030                     15                             1                          10                               1   
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics by Countries 
 
                                            AFEE                                        UAF                                    |DA|                                        Tobin’s Q 
Country               Mean      Med.       Sd.             Mean      Med.        Sd.          Mean      Med.       Sd.         Mean       Med.       Sd. 
                          
Australia             5.21         5.01       1.698           0.047       -0.008     1.09           0.10        0.05      0.141         2.08         1.33       2.146 
Denmark            5.49          5.19       1.433           0.029        0.064     1.09            0.05        0.03      0.064         1.33         1.03       1.057 
Hong Kong         5              4.93        1.014         -0.335       -0.307     0.843        0.11        0.05      0.139         1.43         0.90       1.710 
Ireland               5.77         5.54         1.468         -0.303       -0.247     0.853        0.06        0.03      0.083         1.46         1.18       1.046 
Italy                    7.72         8.81         2.783         0.577        1.39         2.06          0.06         0.04      0.084         1.33        1.17       0.682      
Malaysia            3.58          3.41        1.076        -0.295       -0.305      0.885         0.09         0.04      0.122         1.30        0.96       1.312 
New Zealand     5.24          5.20        1.211        -0.202      -0.053       0.868         0.04         0.02       0.067        1.46        1.17        0.91 
Norway              5.52          5.32        1.564          -0.55         -0.60      1.34           0.07         0.04       0.102         1.41       1.09        1.408 
Singapore          4.76          4.79        1.24          -0.002       0.129       1.09           0.07         0.04      0.089         1.21        0.95       1.009 
South Africa      6.08          6.13         1.5           1.49           1.57       0.949          0.08         0.04       0.098        1.48         1.21       1.090 
Sweden              6.38          6.21        1.496        0.765         0.826      0.923          0.07         0.04       0.099        1.63        1.27       1.127 
United Kingdom  5.86        5.69       1.521        0.124         0.121      0.817           0.07         0.04       0.104        1.61        1.19      1.444 




Table 3: Pearson Correlations among Regression Variables 
 
Variables              |DA|                UAF               LITIGATE              B4                LNTA               LEVE              CFO               GROWTH              ∆PPE               LOSS_1               
 
UAF                         -0.055 
                                 (0.000) 
LITIGATE              -0.003             -0.126 
                                (0.679)            (0.000) 
B4                            -0.083             -0.047                  0.086 
                                (0.000)            (0.000)                (0.000) 
LNTA                     -0.226               0.064                 -0.069                   0.282 
                                (0.000)            (0.000)                (0.000)                (0.000) 
LEVE                      0.074               0.044                 -0.009                   -0.012            -0.043 
                                (0.000)            (0.000)                 (0.183)               (0.073)           (0.000) 
CFO                       -0.015               0.053                   0.000                  0.019              0.103             0.002 
                               (0.019)             (0.000)                (0.943)                (0.003)           (0.000)           (0.798) 
GROWTH              0.080               -0.015                  0.003                  -0.015            -0.003            -0.002              0.000  
                               (0.000)              (0.019)               (0.645)                (0.017)           (0.608)           (0.709)           (0.923) 
∆PPE                      0.013                0.030                  -0.004                 0.000               0.035             0.000             0.513               0.003       
                               (0.041)             (0.000)                (0.548)                (0.092)           (0.000)           (0.991)           (0.000)           (0.697) 
LOSS_1                  0.239                -0.016                  0.025                 -0.092             -0.039             0.061            -0.019              0.019                    -0.004               




Empirical results on the association between audit fees and accruals  
conditional on different legal regime measurements  
This table reports the weighted least square regression results of the effects of measures of accruals and strength of legal regimes on 
audit fees. The dependent variable is audit fees. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Coefficient estimates (p-values) are 
provided in the top (bottom) row.  
 
 
Panel A: Accruals are measured by Absolute Total Accruals
 
                                                                                                           InvPro                             InvPro                                 InvPro  
                                                                                                           = LAW                            =ENF_PRO                        = CLUSTER   
 
Intercept                                              -5.355                         -5.131                              -4.856                          -5.254 
                                                             (0.00)                          (0.00)                              (0.00)                           (0.00) 
Accruals                                               0.050                           0.090                               0.194                           0.084 
                                                             (0.00)                          (0.00)                              (0.00)                           (0.00) 
Investor Protection                                                                 -0.055                              -0.051                          -0.086 
                                                                                                 (0.00)                             (0.00)                            (0.00) 
Accruals*Investor Protection                                                 -0.050                             -0.146                           -0.041 
                                                                                                 (0.00)                             (0.00)                            (0.00) 
B4                                                          0.032                          0.032                              0.029                            0.026 
                                                              (0.00)                         (0.00)                             (0.00)                            (0.00) 
LNTA                                                     0.833                          0.813                              0.810                            0.813 
                                                              (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
INVREC                                                0.153                           0.146                              0.143                            0.146 
                                                              (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
INTAN                                                   0.078                           0.074                              0.073                            0.068 
                                                              (0.00)                           (0.00)                            (0.00)                           (0.00) 
FOREIGN                                             0.053                           0.066                              0.060                            0.058 
                                                              (0.00)                           (0.00)                             (0.00)                          (0.00) 
EXORD                                                 0.022                           0.030                              0.025                            0.024 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                          (0.00) 
LEVE                                                     -0.027                         -0.021                            -0.023                           -0.027 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
ROA                                                      -0.013                          -0.013                            -0.012                          -0.019 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
BTM                                                      -0.029                          -0.027                            -0.027                          -0.023 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
LOSS                                                      0.041                            0.038                             0.038                            0.042 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
AUD_OPN                                             0.016                           0.015                              0.013                           0.018 
                                                               (0.00)                           (0.00)                             (0.00)                          (0.00) 
GDP_PC                                                0.093                           0.043                              0.103                           0.093 
                                                               (0.00)                           (0.00)                              (0.00)                         (0.00) 
LITIGATE                                              0.099                           0.139                              0.141                            0.132  
                                                               (0.00)                           (0.00)                              (0.00)                         (0.00) 
                                                                              
Industry and Year Dummies                   Yes                               Yes                                 Yes                            Yes 
Adjusted R2                                            0.764                             0.766                             0.765                         0.772 






Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Accruals are measured by Absolute Discretionary Accruals
 
                                                                                                           InvPro                             InvPro                                 InvPro  
                                                                                                           = LAW                            =ENF_PRO                        = CLUSTER   
 
Intercept                                              -5.284                         -5.038                              -4.822                          -5.141 
                                                             (0.00)                          (0.00)                              (0.00)                           (0.00) 
Accruals                                               0.033                           0.062                                0.213                           0.072 
                                                             (0.00)                          (0.00)                              (0.00)                           (0.00) 
Investor Protection                                                                 -0.059                              -0.046                          -0.086 
                                                                                                 (0.00)                             (0.00)                            (0.00) 
Accruals*Investor Protection                                                 -0.036                              -0.183                          -0.045 
                                                                                                 (0.00)                             (0.00)                            (0.00) 
B4                                                          0.033                          0.033                              0.030                             0.027 
                                                              (0.00)                         (0.00)                             (0.00)                            (0.00) 
LNTA                                                     0.830                          0.810                              0.807                             0.809 
                                                              (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
INVREC                                                0.152                           0.144                              0.142                            0.143 
                                                              (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
INTAN                                                   0.079                          0.076                               0.074                            0.070 
                                                              (0.00)                           (0.00)                            (0.00)                           (0.00) 
FOREIGN                                             0.054                          0.067                               0.061                            0.059 
                                                              (0.00)                           (0.00)                             (0.00)                          (0.00) 
EXORD                                                 0.022                          0.029                               0.025                            0.024 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                          (0.00) 
LEVE                                                   - 0.027                         -0.022                             -0.023                          -0.026 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
ROA                                                      -0.019                         -0.019                             -0.019                          -0.026 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
BTM                                                      -0.030                         -0.028                             -0.028                          -0.024 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
LOSS                                                      0.044                           0.042                              0.042                           0.046 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
AUD_OPN                                             0.016                           0.015                              0.013                           0.018 
                                                               (0.00)                           (0.00)                             (0.00)                          (0.00) 
GDP_PC                                                0.092                           0.045                              0.103                           0.092 
                                                               (0.00)                           (0.00)                              (0.00)                         (0.00) 
LITIGATE                                               0.100                          0.139                              0.140                           0.134 
                                                                (0.00)                          (0.00)                              (0.00)                         (0.00) 
Industry and Year Dummies                   Yes                               Yes                                 Yes                            Yes 
Adjusted R2                                            0.762                             0.764                             0.764                         0.771 






Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Accruals are measured by Absolute Lag Discretionary Accruals
 
                                                                                                           InvPro                             InvPro                                 InvPro  
                                                                                                           = LAW                            =ENF_PRO                        = CLUSTER   
 
Intercept                                              -5.241                         -4.976                              -4.577                         -5.0941 
                                                             (0.00)                          (0.00)                              (0.00)                           (0.00) 
LagAccruals                                        0.011                           0.028                               -0.014                          0.030 
                                                             (0.00)                          (0.00)                              (0.61)                           (0.00) 
Investor Protection                                                                 -0.066                              -0.061                         -0.096 
                                                                                                 (0.00)                             (0.00)                            (0.00) 
LagAccruals*Investor Protection                                          -0.020                               0.026                          -0.018 
                                                                                                 (0.00)                             (0.35)                            (0.00) 
B4                                                          0.032                         0.033                              0.030                             0.026 
                                                              (0.00)                         (0.00)                             (0.00)                            (0.00) 
LNTA                                                     0.827                          0.808                             0.807                             0.808 
                                                              (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
INVREC                                                0.154                           0.147                             0.144                            0.146 
                                                              (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
INTAN                                                   0.079                           0.076                             0.075                            0.070 
                                                              (0.00)                           (0.00)                            (0.00)                           (0.00) 
FOREIGN                                             0.053                           0.066                              0.060                           0.058 
                                                              (0.00)                           (0.00)                             (0.00)                          (0.00) 
EXORD                                                 0.021                            0.029                             0.024                           0.023 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                          (0.00) 
LEVE                                                   - 0.026                          -0.022                            -0.023                          -0.026 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
ROA                                                      -0.024                          -0.022                            -0.021                          -0.028 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
BTM                                                      -0.031                          -0.029                            -0.029                          -0.025 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
LOSS                                                      0.045                            0.043                             0.044                           0.048 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
AUD_OPN                                             0.016                            0.015                             0.013                           0.017 
                                                               (0.00)                           (0.00)                             (0.00)                          (0.00) 
GDP_PC                                                0.091                            0.043                             0.099                           0.090 
                                                               (0.00)                           (0.00)                              (0.00)                         (0.00) 
LITIGATE                                              0.102                            0.140                              0.139                          0.135 
                                                                (0.00)                          (0.00)                              (0.00)                         (0.00) 
 
Industry and Year Dummies                   Yes                               Yes                                 Yes                            Yes 
Adjusted R2                                            0.761                             0.763                            0.763                         0.770 







Test of relationship between audit Fees and accruals conditional on different accrual subsamples  
This table reports the weighted least square regression results of the association between audit fees and accruals for positive 
discretionary accrual subsample and negative discretionary accrual subsample respectively. The dependent variable is audit fees. 
Accruals are measured by absolute discretionary accruals and investor protection is measured by CLUSTER. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix. Coefficient estimates (p-values) are provided in the top (bottom) row.  
 
 
                                                                                               (1)                                                                             (2) 
                                                               Positive Discretionary Accrual Subsample               Negative Discretionary Accrual Subsample                                                                                                       
 
Intercept                                              -5.632                          -5.412                            -4.767                          -4.742 
                                                             (0.00)                          (0.00)                              (0.00)                           (0.00) 
Accruals                                               0.016                           0.051                              0.056                            0.107 
                                                             (0.00)                          (0.00)                              (0.00)                           (0.00) 
Investor Protection                                                                 -0.086                                                                  -0.081 
                                                                                                 (0.00)                                                                  (0.00) 
Accruals*Investor Protection                                                 -0.039                                                                  -0.060 
                                                                                                 (0.00)                                                                  (0.00) 
B4                                                          0.028                          0.022                             0.034                             0.030 
                                                              (0.00)                         (0.00)                             (0.00)                            (0.00) 
LNTA                                                     0.822                          0.800                             0.833                            0.813 
                                                              (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
INVREC                                                0.151                           0.142                             0.153                            0.147 
                                                              (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
INTAN                                                   0.086                          0.076                             0.071                             0.063 
                                                              (0.00)                           (0.00)                            (0.00)                           (0.00) 
FOREIGN                                             0.046                          0.052                              0.060                           0.065 
                                                              (0.00)                           (0.00)                             (0.00)                          (0.00) 
EXORD                                                 0.027                          0.031                              0.018                           0.018 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                          (0.00) 
LEVE                                                     0.008                           0.003                            -0.058                          -0.052 
                                                               (0.12)                          (0.65)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
ROA                                                       0.007                           0.001                            -0.021                          -0.027 
                                                               (0.20)                          (0.15)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
BTM                                                      -0.020                         -0.014                            -0.040                           -0.034 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
LOSS                                                      0.048                           0.048                             0.032                            0.036 
                                                               (0.00)                          (0.00)                             (0.00)                           (0.00) 
AUD_OPN                                             0.031                           0.030                             0.003                            0.007 
                                                               (0.00)                           (0.00)                             (0.54)                          (0.19) 
GDP_PC                                                0.092                           0.091                             0.095                            0.097 
                                                               (0.00)                           (0.00)                              (0.00)                         (0.00) 
LITIGATE                                               0.102                           0.133                            0.094                            0.128 
                                                                (0.00)                          (0.00)                              (0.00)                         (0.00) 
Industry and Year Dummies                   Yes                               Yes                                 Yes                            Yes 
Adjusted R2                                            0.781                             0.790                             0.749                         0.757 







Test on incremental impacts of Big4 on the association between audit Fees and accruals  
This table reports the weighted least square regression results of the incremental impacts of big 4 auditor on fees-accruals association. The 
dependent variable is audit fees. Accruals are measured by magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals and investor protection is measured by 
CLUSTER. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Coefficient estimates (p-values) are provided in the top (bottom) row.  
 
 
                                                                               (1)                                             (2)                                              (3) 
 
Intercept                                                   -5.126                                      -5.023                                   -4.970                      
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)                            
Accruals                                                     0.039                                       0.073                                    0.039                       
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)      
Investor Protection                                   -0.102                                     -0.123                                   -0.140 
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00) 
B4                                                               0.027                                      0.006                                    -0.005                      
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.24)                                     (0.45)                             
Accruals*Investor Protection                                                                 -0.043                                     -0.002 
                                                                                                                  (0.00)                                      (0.89) 
Accruals*B4                                                                                            -0.002                                      0.037 
                                                                                                                  (0.71)                                      (0.00) 
Investor Protection *B4                                                                           0.045                                      0.066 
                                                                                                                  (0.00)                                      (0.00) 
B4*Accruals*Investor Protection                                                                                                          -0.048                                             
                                                                                                                                                                 (0.00) 
LNTA                                                          0.812                                      0.808                                     0.808                     
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)                            
INVREC                                                      0.143                                     0.143                                      0.143                       
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)                            
INTAN                                                        0.070                                      0.070                                      0.070                      
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)                            
FOREIGN                                                  0.059                                      0.059                                      0.059                      
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)                           
EXORD                                                      0.024                                      0.024                                      0.023                       
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00) 
LEVE                                                        -0.028                                      -0.026                                    -0.026                      
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)                            
ROA                                                         - 0.023                                      -0.026                                    -0.026                    
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)                            
BTM                                                          -0.024                                     -0.024                                    -0.024                    
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)                            
LOSS                                                          0.047                                       0.046                                     0.046                       
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)                            
AUD_OPN                                                 0.017                                       0.018                                     0.018                            
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00) 
GDP_PC                                                     0.093                                       0.091                                    0.091                     
                                                                   (0.00)                                       (0.00)                                    (0.00)                          
LITIGATE                                                   0.133                                       0.133                                    0.133                     
                                                                   (0.00)                                       (0.00)                                    (0.00)                          
Industry and Year Dummies                       Yes                                          Yes                                        Yes                             
Adjusted R2                                                 0.771                                        0.771                                    0.772                          






Test on the association between unexpected audit fees and discretionary accruals  
This table reports the weighted least square regression results of the association between unexpected audit fees and absolute 
discretionary accruals. The dependent variable is absolute discretionary accruals. Accruals are measured by magnitude of absolute 




                                                                               (1)                                             (2)                                                 (3) 
                                                                        Full Sample                       Positive UAF Subsample              Negative UAF Subsample 
 
Intercept                                                    0.138                                       0.154                                      0.145                      
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)                            
UAF                                                           0.064                                      0.075                                       0.014                    
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.14)      
B4                                                             -0.003                                     -0.010                                     -0.008                      
                                                                   (0.64)                                      (0.29)                                     (0.41)                             
LNTA                                                        - 0.261                                    -0.241                                     -0.308                       
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)                            
LEVE                                                          0.093                                      0.049                                      0.150                      
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)                            
GROWTH                                                   0.193                                      0.207                                      0.174                    
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)                            
C_PPE                                                       0.011                                      -0.016                                     0.075                     
                                                                   (0.11)                                      (0.11)                                     (0.00)                            
LOSS_1                                                      0.122                                      0.142                                       0.101                       
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00)  
CFO                                                           0.049                                       0.036                                      0.047 
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.00) 
AUD_OPN                                                 0.025                                       0.032                                     0.017                             
                                                                   (0.00)                                      (0.00)                                     (0.06) 
LITIGATE                                                   0.016                                      0.030                                     0.048                     
                                                                   (0.02)                                       (0.00)                                    (0.00)                          
Industry and Year Dummies                       Yes                                          Yes                                        Yes                             
Adjusted R2                                                 0.147                                        0.154                                    0.159                          





Test on the association between unexpected audit fees and discretionary accruals:  
Positive UAF Subsample only  
This table reports the weighted least square regression results of the association between unexpected audit 
fees and absolute discretionary accruals. The dependent variable is absolute discretionary accruals. 
Accruals are measured by magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals. All variables are defined in the 




                                                                               (1)                                                               (2) 
                                                              Positive DA Subsample                                Negative DA Subsample               
 
Intercept                                                    0.189                                                     0.213                                                    
                                                                   (0.00)                                                    (0.00)                                      
UAF                                                           0.046                                                     0.064                                
                                                                   (0.00)                                                    (0.00)                                      
B4                                                              0.003                                                    -0.003                                      
                                                                   (0.81)                                                    (0.82)                                      
LNTA                                                        - 0.250                                                  -0.366                                
                                                                   (0.00)                                                    (0.00)                                      
LEVE                                                          0.069                                                    0.188                                
                                                                   (0.00)                                                    (0.00)                                      
GROWTH                                                   0.194                                                    0.145                                
                                                                   (0.00)                                                    (0.00)                                      
C_PPE                                                       0.052                                                     0.015                                      
                                                                   (0.00)                                                    (0.23)                                      
LOSS_1                                                      0.089                                                    0.162                               
                                                                   (0.00)                                                   (0.00)                                      
CFO                                                          -0.023                                                   0.078                                
                                                                   (0.12)                                                   (0.00)                                      
AUD_OPN                                                 0.056                                                   0.032                               
                                                                   (0.00)                                                   (0.01)                                      
LITIGATE                                                   0.018                                                  0.084                               
                                                                   (0.15)                                                   (0.00)                                   
Industry and Year Dummies                       Yes                                                      Yes                                                                 
Adjusted R2                                                 0.147                                                   0.233                                    








Empirical Results on Endogeneity Tests 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Audit Fees 
 
(1)                                                                 (2) 
                                                                               First-Stage (DV= ׀DA׀)                             Second-Stage (DV= AFEE)                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
Intercept                                                                      0.115                                                     -5.347 
                                                                                      (0.00)                                                     (0.00)                                  
Endogenous Variable 
                                                                                                                                           0.044 
                                                                                                                                                     (0.00)                                  
Variables in Both Models 
     B4                                                                         -0.003                                                       0.034 
                                                                                    (0.69)                                                        (0.00)                                  
     LNTA                                                                   -0.194                                                        0.839 
                                                                                    (0.00)                                                        (0.00)                                  
     LEVE                                                                    0.046                                                      -0.026 
                                                                                    (0.00)                                                        (0.00)                                  
AUD_OPN                                                            0.017                                                        0.013 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                        (0.00)                                  
LITIGATE                                                              0.037                                                       0.096 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                        (0.00)                                         
Variables in Audit Fees Model 
INVREC                                                                0.082                                                         0.143 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                        (0.00)                                  
INTAN                                                                  -0.005                                                        0.086 
                                                                                (0.45)                                                        (0.00)                                  
FOREIGN                                                            -0.019                                                        0.058 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                        (0.00)                                  
EXORD                                                               -0.028                                                         0.026 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                        (0.00)                                  
ROA                                                                    -0.126                                                         -0.006 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                        (0.27)                                  
BTM                                                                    -0.020                                                        -0.031 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                        (0.00)                                  
LOSS                                                                    0.036                                                         0.049 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                       (0.00)                                  
GDP_PC                                                            -0.029                                                         0.094 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                       (0.00)                                  
Variables in DA Model 
Growth                                                                 0.197 
                                                                               (0.00)                                  
C_PPE                                                                 0.025 
                                                                               (0.00)                                  
LOSS_1                                                               0.083 
                                                                               (0.00)                                  
CFO                                                                    0.038 
                                                                               (0.00)                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Industry and Year Dummies                                       Yes                                                            Yes 
Adjusted R2                                                               0.163                                                        0.753 





Table 9 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Absolute Discretionary Accruals 
 
(1)                                                                 (2) 
                                                                               First-Stage (DV=AFEE)                               Second-Stage (DV= ׀DA׀)                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
Intercept                                                                     -4.548                                                      0.186 
                                                                                      (0.00)                                                     (0.00)                                  
Endogenous Variable 
                                                                                                                                         0.177 
                                                                                                                                                     (0.00)                                  
Variables in Both Models 
     B4                                                                         0.038                                                       -0.016 
                                                                                    (0.00)                                                        (0.02)                                  
     LNTA                                                                    0.746                                                       -0.414 
                                                                                    (0.00)                                                        (0.00)                                  
     LEVE                                                                   -0.015                                                       0.079 
                                                                                    (0.00)                                                        (0.00)                                  
AUD_OPN                                                             0.010                                                       0.026 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                        (0.00)                                  
LITIGATE                                                              0.108                                                       -0.008 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                        (0.33)                                         
Variables in Audit Fees Model 
INVREC                                                                 0.149                                                   
                                                                                (0.00)                                                        
INTAN                                                                    0.087                                                  
                                                                                (0.00)                                                         
FOREIGN                                                               0.064                                                  
                                                                                (0.00)                                                         
EXORD                                                                   0.029                                                   
                                                                                (0.00)                                                         
ROA                                                                       -0.004                                                   
                                                                                (0.35)                                                         
BTM                                                                       -0.029                                                
                                                                                (0.00)                                                         
LOSS                                                                      0.044                                                 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                        
GDP_PC                                                                 0.089                                                   
                                                                                (0.00)                                                       
Variables in DA Model 
Growth                                                                 - 0.012                                                       0.197 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                       (0.00)                                  
C_PPE                                                                   0.007                                                        0.014 
                                                                                (0.06)                                                       (0.04) 
LOSS_1                                                                   0.041                                                       0.119 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                       (0.00)                                  
CFO                                                                        0.114                                                       0.037 
                                                                                (0.00)                                                       (0.00)                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Industry and Year Dummies                                       Yes                                                            Yes 
Adjusted R2                                                               0.762                                                        0.144 




Empirical results on the association between audit fees and firm value 
This table reports the weighted least square regression results of the effects of audit fees and strength of legal 
regimes on firm value. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Coefficient 
estimates (p-values) are provided in the top (bottom) row.  
 
 
Panel A: Audit fees are measured by UAF
 
                                                                             InvPro                                InvPro                                   InvPro  
                                                                            = LAW                               =ENF_PRO                           = CLUSTER   
 
Intercept                                                      3.175                                 2.394                              3.438 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                              (0.00) 
UAF                                                             0.148                                0.235                               0.108 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                              (0.00) 
Investor Protection                                      0.159                                0.209                               0.065 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
UAF*Investor Protection                           -0.044                              -0.125                                0.011 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.22) 
LNTA                                                          -0.207                              -0.210                              -0.192 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
LEVE                                                           0.077                                0.077                               0.073 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
PROFIT                                                       0.057                                0.057                               0.057 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
GROWTH                                                    0.022                                0.024                               0.023 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
B4                                                               -0.007                               -0.001                              -0.002 
                                                                    (0.27)                                (0.86)                               (0.81) 
AUD_OPN                                                 -0.001                                0.003                                0.000 
                                                                    (0.83)                                (0.62)                               (0.98) 
GDP_PC                                                     0.197                                0.051                               0.116 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
EQUITY                                                     -0.141                               -0.203                              -0.098 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
Industry and Year Dummies                        Yes                                   Yes                                  Yes 
Adjusted R2                                                 0.110                                 0.114                                0.101 








Panel B: Audit fees are measured by AFEE
 
                                                                             InvPro                                InvPro                                   InvPro  
                                                                            = LAW                               =ENF_PRO                           = CLUSTER   
 
Intercept                                                      2.916                                1.855                               3.372 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                              (0.00) 
AFEE                                                           0.273                               0.389                                0.248 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                              (0.00) 
Investor Protection                                      0.228                               0.217                                0.137 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
AFEE*Investor Protection                         -0.138                              -0.218                              -0.075 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
LNTA                                                          -0.339                              -0.327                              -0.352 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
LEVE                                                           0.095                               0.096                                0.091 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
PROFIT                                                       0.055                               0.056                                0.056 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
GROWTH                                                    0.018                               0.018                                0.018 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
B4                                                               -0.012                               -0.010                             -0.011 
                                                                    (0.06)                                (0.13)                               (0.09) 
AUD_OPN                                                  0.013                                0.015                                0.010 
                                                                    (0.04)                                (0.02)                               (0.12) 
GDP_PC                                                     0.118                                0.044                               0.108 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
EQUITY                                                     -0.089                               -0.147                              -0.146 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
Industry and Year Dummies                        Yes                                   Yes                                  Yes 
Adjusted R2                                                 0.106                                 0.109                                0.107 












Table 10 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Audit fees are measured by UAF (Add additional control variables) 
 
                                                                             InvPro                                InvPro                                   InvPro  
                                                                            = LAW                               =ENF_PRO                           = CLUSTER   
 
Intercept                                                      2.999                                 2.212                               3.213 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                              (0.00) 
UAF                                                             0.133                                0.185                               0.096 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                              (0.00) 
Investor Protection                                      0.161                                0.210                               0.052 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
UAF*Investor Protection                           -0.036                              -0.083                                0.018 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.02)                               (0.03) 
׀DA׀                                                             0.094                                0.093                                0.091 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00)                                  
׀DA׀*UAF                                                   0.001                               0.000                                -0.003 
                                                                     (0.88)                               (0.96)                               (0.67)  
LNTA                                                          -0.183                              -0.186                               -0.166 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
LEVE                                                           0.067                                0.067                                0.063 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
PROFIT                                                       0.057                                0.057                                0.057 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
GROWTH                                                    0.002                                0.004                               0.003 
                                                                    (0.79)                                (0.56)                               (0.62) 
B4                                                               -0.007                                0.000                              -0.001 
                                                                    (0.32)                                (0.98)                               (0.83) 
AUD_OPN                                                 -0.005                                0.000                               -0.003 
                                                                    (0.41)                                (0.94)                               (0.65) 
GDP_PC                                                     0.199                                0.051                                0.116 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
EQUITY                                                     -0.142                               -0.205                               -0.088 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
 
Industry and Year Dummies                        Yes                                   Yes                                  Yes 
Adjusted R2                                                 0.118                                 0.121                                0.108 

















Empirical results on the association between UAF and future CFO 
This table reports the weighted least square regression results of the effects of audit fees and strength of legal 
regimes on firm value. The dependent variable is CFO of the following year for a firm. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix. Coefficient estimates (p-values) are provided in the top (bottom) row.  
 
 
                                                                             InvPro                                InvPro                                    InvPro  
                                                                            = LAW                               =ENF_PRO                           = CLUSTER   
 
Intercept                                                     -1.663E6                         -1.832E6                           -1.852E6 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                                (0.00) 
UAF                                                             0.081                                0.136                                0.093 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                                (0.00) 
Investor Protection                                     -0.047                              -0. 003                             -0.003 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.57)                                (0.63) 
UAF*Investor Protection                           -0.028                              -0.077                              -0.048 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.02)                                (0.00) 
CFO                                                             0.590                                0.599                               0.597 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                                (0.00) 
LNTA                                                           0.203                                0.204                                0.203 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
LEVE                                                          -0.035                              -0.033                               -0.034 
                                                                    (0.00)                                (0.00)                               (0.00) 
PROFIT                                                       0.007                               0.006                                 0.006 
                                                                    (0.19)                                (0.24)                               (0.22) 
Industry and Year Dummies                        Yes                                   Yes                                  Yes 
Adjusted R2                                                 0.574                                 0.572                                0.573 
N                                                                 15,491                           15,491                           15,491 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
